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SIPBIO - L’EXTENSION DU PROTOCOLE SIP POUR LA BIOMÉTRIE VOCALE
Wilmar PEREZ
RÉSUMÉ
Au cours des dernières décennies, les technologies biométriques sont devenues un important
domaine de recherche pour l’industrie de la sécurité informatique. Néanmoins, le déploiement
de ces technologies dans des systèmes d’entreprise hétérogènes est complexe compte tenu du
manque de standardisation. Le SIP est un protocole de signalisation répendu qui est largement
utilisé pour les communications vocales sur des réseaux internet. Grâce à sa ﬂexibilité, SIP
a été adopté à grande échelle pour les systémes de téléphonie. Ce mémoire propose SIPBIO,
une extension du SIP, qui permet d’établir et contrôler les sessions multimédias utilisant les
interactions biométriques.
Le premier chapitre ce mémoire a pour but d’explorer les techniques qui permettent de véri-
ﬁer l’identité des personnes par la reconnaissance des caractéristiques intrinsèques de l’être
humaine aﬁn d’avoir accès aux ressources du réseau. Notablement, ce chapitre présente une
description claire de l’utilisation de la biométrie dans les réseaux de télécommunication. Le
deuxième chapitre montre une introduction du protocole SIP en mettant l’accent sur la com-
pression de ses messages et ses composants. Le troisième chapitre donne une introduction de
nouveaux concepts telle que les extensions du protocole par défaut.
Le chapitre quatre et cinq de ce mémoire présente la base de travail pour la mise en œuvre du
protocole SIPBIO. Le chapitre quatre présente une description détaillée des exigences requises
pour SIPBIO en utilisant des scénarios typiques pour les opérations biométriques. Ce chapitre
fournit une déﬁnition du processus formel pour SIPBIO. Le chapitre cinq présente une déﬁ-
nition de tous les en-têtes et les composants du corps de SIPBIO qui donnent sa forme et qui
déﬁnissent sa nature. Finalement, le chapitre six montre une simulation du protocole.
Les résultats de ce mémoire conﬁrment la viabilité de l’utilisation d’un protocole basé sur
SIP pour l’instauration, la maintenance et le démontage des sessions multimédias avec des
objectives concernant à la biométrie.
Mots clés: SIP, Biométrie, sécurité du réseau, authentication à distance, protocole de commu-
nication

SIPBIO - BIOMETRICS SIP EXTENSION
Wilmar PEREZ
ABSTRACT
During the last few decades biometric technologies have become an important research ﬁeld in
computer security. Their deployment, however, in heterogeneous enterprise systems, is com-
plex due to the lack of standardisation. Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is a popular communi-
cation protocol widely used in voice over Internet protocol networks; due to its ﬂexibility, SIP
has been broadly adopted in telecommunications for carrier level and telephony systems. This
thesis proposes the use of SIPBIO, an extension to SIP, to establish and control multimedia
sessions for biometric interactions.
For biometric usage in telecommunications networks, a synthesis of techniques to use hu-
man characteristics as challenge tokens for access to network resources is ﬁrst presented. An
overview of the SIP protocol is then exposed, by focusing on understanding SIP messages and
their component elements. Posteriorly, advanced concepts, such as extensions to the default
protocol are introduced.
After the technology background review, the core of the proposal is presented with extensive
use-case scenarios of biometric operations and the introduction of necessary SIPBIO require-
ments. Formal processes are deﬁned along with the method to extend SIP to the proposed
SIPBIO protocol. It follows a detailed outline of all headers and body components that give
form to SIPBIO and deﬁne its nature. These stages provide the fundamentals for the protocol
implementation.
Finally, simulations of some common cases are presented to show the feasibility of SIPBIO.
This can be used as a sample ﬂow for full implementations and applications.
This thesis corroborates the viability of using a SIP-based protocol for establishing, maintain-
ing and tearing down biometric multimedia sessions.
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INTRODUCTION
All individuals involved with digital information transfer are now aware of the implications of
the lack of security in computer systems. A combination of early design decisions and com-
mercial interests led to the release of a plethora of products ﬂawed by poor security practises.
A common approach to cyber threats has been to make it very cumbersome for users to access
a computer system. This approach has taken various forms: long, complex and difﬁcult to
remember passwords; token-based security, where a trusted third party guarantees the authen-
ticity of the parties and the integrity of the data being exchanged; geographical and IP-based
access restriction, among others. The combination of these techniques makes it difﬁcult for an
attacker to access non-authorised information. However, this approach has also made it difﬁ-
cult for legitimate users to use resources they are entitled to. The academics, and a sector of
the industry, have worked in the development of secured easy to use systems. However, many
of the proposed systems are still highly complex for the regular user, requiring a level of user
participation that is not easily achievable. In the last two decades, two technologies have gone
through dynamic trends of development and investment:
• Biometric technologies. A way of identifying people by a combination of what they are
and what they know (Jain et al., 2016).
• SIP communications. A technology to standardise signalling between parties who need to
exchange media information (Rosenberg et al., 2002).
Biometric technologies have extensive security applications while SIP powers the develop-
ment and enhancement of products, notably, those related to telephony over Internet Protocol
networks.
Both of these ﬁelds have reached technological maturity. Biometric authentication is a proven
and accepted way to recognise individuals and grant them access to systems of information
2(Beranek, 2013). SIP is the accepted standard for establishing multimedia sessions (Sisalem
et al., 2013).
This thesis aims to contribute to the development of comprehensive, ﬂexible, and secured sys-
tems, which are easy to implement and understand. This thesis argues that it is possible to
leverage SIP properties to create a common session establishment protocol for sessions that
require biometric authentication. By using an already trusted protocol, vendors can provide
standard solutions to include biometric-based authentication, and access control, across net-
work elements. They will know that their solution can be easily integrated with other elements
of a system supporting the same standard. These solutions can be proven to be simpler for
the end user. They beneﬁt by accessing resources using their own biological properties as an
authentication token. The approach could be as simple as associating a user’s voice with a
standard user identiﬁer, which would require the user to speak in their normal voice or to re-
peat a simple predetermined phrase. An interaction of this kind is easier than typing a long and
complicated password. An extension to the SIP protocol, called SIPBIO is proposed to handle
the tasks of establishing a biometric session.
Chapter 1 reviews the history and development of using biometric methods in telecommunica-
tions networks. Several earlier proposals are identiﬁed and analysed in the context of their own
time and for their contribution to most recent technological developments. Chapter 2 reviews
the basic concepts of the SIP protocol in preparation for Chapter ?? which presents relevant
SIP canonical extensions. The aim of this analysis is to reveal how SIP is extended in prac-
tice and how these previous extentions can be applied to the SIPBIO proposal. In Chapter 3
the evaluation methodology is explained in detail, starting with some test case scenarios. This
information will lead to building SIPBIO requirements that serve as the base for the protocol
construction later. Finally, the process of extending SIP is explained in detail.
3Chapter 4 presents how SIPBIO can be used to handle different types of biometric processes,
and the core of the protocol, its ﬂows and SIP messages. Chapter 4 is the core of this proposal.
The concepts are reinforced in Chapter 5 with a simulation of a protocol implementation.
Finally, the conclusions are presented along with suggestions for extended developments around
the SIPBIO proposal.
This thesis is motivated by ﬁfteen years of telecommunications experience in the ﬁeld, work-




BIOMETRIC AUTHENTICATION IN TELECOMMUNICATION NETWORKS.
The idea of using biometric techniques to authenticate users in telecommunications has been
around for many years as a theoretical, yet cumbersome to implement, possibility (Lapere and John-
son, 1997). Recent increases in computing power, data transmission speeds and the availability
of affordable storage, now make viable the use of biometrics in enterprise and consumer-based
telecommunications (Gafurov, 2010).
The deﬁnition of a telecommunications network derives from the concepts of computer net-
works and distributed systems. According to Tanenbaum and Wetherall (2011a), a computer
network is a collection of autonomous computers (nodes) interconnected by a single technol-
ogy and a distributed system is a collection of independent computers that appear to their users
as a single coherent system. Consequently, a telecommunications network can be deﬁned as
a distributed system in which nodes are either computing entities or computer networks and
offers services related to information sharing.
The above deﬁnition determines that the main objective of telecommunications is to share or
allow access to information through or from any kind of voice or data network. Information
can take any form, including documents, audio, voice and video. Some information is intended
to be openly available, such as websites on the Internet. Other information is restricted to a
single party like a personal bank account web site or phone line or to a speciﬁc group of people
as with a corporate intranet. Different mechanisms have been developed to control access to
shared resources, which use passive or active authentication by the user sharing the resources
(Mallery, 2013).
When telephonic communications were controlled by public providers, security was main-
tained by their exclusive access to all hardware. As networks evolved to packet and mobile-
based technologies access was controlled by a personal identiﬁcation number (PIN) and, in
the case of mobile telecommunications, a smart card in the form of a Subscriber Identiﬁcation
6Module (SIM). These solutions are convenient but lack security (Lapere and Johnson, 1997).
Any telecommunications access control measure must meet the following requirements:
a. be simple to use yet effective enough to provide a noticeable level of security;
b. be measurable, recorded and quantiﬁable (Eur, 1997).
These are also characteristics of a biometric security system.
Biometric characteristics for authentication in telecommunications environments have been ex-
plored since the 1990s when the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI)1,
made it a priority to provide secure communications standards for UMTS. They stated, "with-
out a reliable authentication service through the Telecommunications Management Networks
(TMN), every other effort to secure the system is in vain" (Eur, 1997). In the 1990s, there
were obstacles to use biometric authentication methods: sensors were costly, processing power
was low, service provider charges for data transmission were very high, acceptance and use
of the technology were challenging. In the particular case of voice biometrics, telephones al-
ready had audio capturing sensors and they were a familiar device, making them a viable and
non-intrusive option.
1.1 Basic biometric architecture
Communication network biometric systems are known as remote biometric authentication sys-
tems (Syta et al., 2015). A general architecture of a biometric system is shown in Figure 1.1.
The set of relevant elements shown in Figure 1.1 are described by Gafurov (2010):
• A subject from whom the biometric information is read.
1 www.etsi.org
7Figure 1.1 Basic biometric process.
• The biometric data capturing process. This is accomplished by one or more mechani-
cal or electrical objects that capture raw data to be analysed. The usual objects are mi-
crophones, webcams, mobile phones (which have several capturing methods), ﬁngerprint
readers, keyboards, mouse devices. A capturing element does not have to be a device
speciﬁcally designed for biometric operations. A ﬁnger print reader has been specially
designed for biometric data capture whilst a telephone has not. In general, any device able
to retrieve biometric data and retransmit it in a digital format can be considered a capturing
element.
• Database: Once a template is created, it is stored in a database. During a veriﬁcation
process, the matcher retrieves the claimed user template from the database and compares it
with the one obtained from the feature extractor.
• The extraction process of ﬁnding the digital representation biometric data. It is as a two-
step process:
• Pre-processing: Before being digitized, the raw data set is pre-processed to assess its
quality. It is then segmented and enhanced. A quality assurance process for the raw
data set is necessary to determine if more sets of biometric data are to be collected.
Segmentation is mainly the process of separating actual biometric information from the
background model. Finally, the raw data set is enhanced to improve its quality and
reduce signal noise.
8• Feature extractor: Pre-processed biometric information is digitized to create a biomet-
ric template. This template is expected to have unique individual information. This step
is functionally merged with the template creation and matcher processes. For a new
biometric speaker, the product of the feature extractor is used to build their biometric
template. In the case of an existing speaker, the product is used to create a temporary
digital representation of the captured biometric payload to be compared against their
existing stored template.
1.2 Interpretation of biometric results
In telecommunications networks, as in biometric systems, the tradeoff between False Accepts
(FA) and False Rejects (FR) is an ubiquitous problem. During an authentication process a
stored biometric print is compared against the results of a live feature extraction process as
shown in Figure 1.1. When an imposter is authorized, it is called a False Accept. When the
authentic user is denied access, it is known as a False Reject. The probabilities of these events
happening are, correspondingly, False Accept Rate (FAR) and False Reject Rate (FRR) (Reid,
2003a). These two rates should be as close to zero as possible. Figure 1.2 shows a distribution
of authentication events for a general population. This representation is commonly known as
an Equal Error Rate (EER) curve. Biometric implementations set thresholds to balance high
security with convenience of use. The more secure the system, the higher the likelihood of a
FR event. The more convenient the system, the higher the probability of a FA event. Note that
the curves in Figure 1.2 are not normal distributions but simply a generalist representation of
the expected number of reject and accept events.
Deﬁning the following events:
• Impostor: a fraudster.
• Authentic: authorized user.
9Figure 1.2 EER curve.
• Positive Result: a result of a biometric operation giving the provider of the bioprint as the
authentic user.
Each event can be true or false. For instance, whether an Impostor is actually a fraudster or
not. The result depends on several factors, mainly, the algorithm itself and the quality of the
training set (data use to tune the system).
The EER distribution, inferred from a formulation of the Bayes’ theorem (Lee, 2012), would





• P(Impostor | Positive Result): the probability of the bioprint belonging to an impostor given
that the result of the operation was positive.
• P(Positive Result | Impostor): the probability of having a positive result in the operation
given that the bioprint provider is an impostor.
• P(Impostor): the probability of the bioprint provider being an impostor.
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• P(Authentic | !Impostor): the probability of the operation yielding a positive result given
that the bioprint provider is not a fraudster (it is the true user).
• P(!Impostor): the probability of a bioprint provider not being a fraudster (being the true
user).
In general, Equation 1.1 can be interpreted as the probability of obtaining a positive result when
the bioprint provider is an authorized user divided by the probability of obtaining a positive
result in the operation regardless of the nature of the provided bioprint.
1.3 Literature review
Several identity management systems for secure authentication have been proposed. This sec-
tion reviews not only some of those systems but also some previous studies that made them
possible.
1.3.1 Interoperable framework for biometric communications
It was once unsafe and expensive to perform remote authentication on telecommunications net-
works, so the focus of early biometric authentication was on local authentication. Here, remote
authentication refers to a system where the subject and the biometric capturing mechanisms
are in a different local area network (LAN) to that of the rest of the biometric system as rep-
resented in Figure 1.1. This situation made biometric authentication technique impossible in
practice. With the availability of higher bandwidth and the development of trafﬁc encryption
techniques, the possibility of using remotely distributed processing power and storage became
a more acceptable option (Benavente and Piccio-Marchetti, 2005).
Biometric implementations must be inherently secured. Security of communication paths and
data repositories must be mandatory. Benavente and Piccio-Marchetti (2005) proposed the en-
capsulation of the whole communication path during the biometric interaction, suggesting a
interoperable framework. This framework has three components: the ﬁrst is an API to access
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biometric functions, the second is another API to access biometric information in the form of
a token, which is as a pattern provided for comparisons, and the third component is a fusion
layer that exposes a common interface to third-party applications using a given framework.
The second API performs matching between the protocols. Each module uses encryption and
authentication protocols in the form of Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) over a Trans-
port Layer Security (TLS) tunnel. Further details are not discussed because more suitable
approaches have been proposed since. However, this contribution was important in raising
awareness about the security challenges faced by biometric authentication methods when used
over communication networks.
1.3.2 IDM3G, identity management protocol
Dimitriadis and Polemi (2006) propose a detailed identity management protocol (IDM3G) for
Internet applications over 3G mobile networks. This protocol combines the identity manage-
ment principles of the former Liberty Alliance speciﬁcation (currently Kantara Initiative)2 with
those of the Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards (OA-
SIS)3 and the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) 4. This proposal seeks to provide
a lightweight identity management system. Its relevance is linked to three key concepts re-
quired for any authentication protocol: security assessment, performance and implementation
complexity. Dimitriadis and Polemi (2006) use the same Authentication Key Agreement (AKA)
mechanism of the Universal Mobile Telecommunications Systems (UMTS), which is the formal
extension of the PIN/SIM combination previously mentioned. IDM3G speciﬁes four entities:
user (U), User’s SIM (USIM), Mobile Operator (MO) and Service Provider (SP). The logic
of the protocol is based on the transmission of a random token from U to SP. The same token
is then forwarded by SP to MO, which will use it to determine which voice and data services
to provide to U. IDM3G assumes that there is already a trust relationship between MO and





not limited to biometric authentication). IDM3G also assumes that between the USIM and the
MO there is a mutual UMTS-AKA mechanism to guarantee the identity of the parties. The
technical details of the IDM3G protocol are beyond the scope of this document, however, it
can be summarised as follows:
a. USIM request a service on behalf of U, who has been previously authenticated.
b. USIM provides proof of identity to MO.
c. SP requests MO to verify the USIM identity.
d. MO certiﬁes the USIM identity based on matching of the two pieces of information, the
one sent by SP and the one previously sent by USIM.
IDM3G was evaluated in terms of performance, implementation complexity and security (the
third, security, against guidelines established by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)5.
SIPBIO uses similar guidelines to be explicated in Chapter 3.
1.3.3 Voice Interactive Personalized Security
Another interesting proposal for the use of biometrics for telephony environments was the Voice
Interactive Personalized Security (VoIPSEC) protocol presented by Kopsidas et al. (2006).
VoIPSEC attempts to provide end-to-end secured communications with the use of inbound
key exchange and biometric veriﬁcation. Through analysis of VoIP communication patterns
over the Internet, the authors concluded that an end-to-end encryption between the parties was
the only way to offer full communications conﬁdentiality. VoIPSEC was intended to provide




a. A private key, a public key and a User Session Signature (USS) for each party. The USS
has a particular property: it can be any binary object that the party prefers to use (e.g. an
email address, a video, etc.).
b. A symmetric session key to be used during the communication between both parties.
In the second phase, the communication parties were to exchange the symmetric session key
and their respective USS. In the third phase, the USS was to be biometrically veriﬁed. This
biometric action could be of level 1 (only voice) or level 2 (voice and video). If any partici-
pant were not successfully veriﬁed, both communication parties were to be notiﬁed. It is up
to the application using the protocol to deﬁne if it makes the authentication compulsory or
if it gives the participant the option to continue opening the communication channel after an
unsuccessful veriﬁcation. The security of the protocol depends heavily on the USS and the
symmetric session key exchanged by the participants before any information was to be trans-
mitted. This behaviour is quite similar to a registration process. Research literature suggests
that the VoIPSEC proposal has not been adopted. It may be because it appears rather com-
plicated and no canonical implementation is freely available. However, the use of biometric
data as part of an authentication process makes VoIPSEC an interesting alternative: it uses the
biometric information to secure itself.
1.3.4 BIO3G protocol
Another attempt to create a biometric based authentication protocol was presented by Dimitri-
adis and Shaikh (2007) with their BIO3G protocol proposal for Third Generation (3G) mobile
systems. This was an extension of what was commented on above and presented by Dimitri-
adis and Polemi (2006). Unlike VoIPSEC, BIO3G does not enroll users or transfer any data
across the data network. The aim of BIO3G is to provide PIN-less authentication between an
end user and a mobile operator using only biometric techniques, without the need for biomet-
ric enrolment. BIO3G still uses the same network access authentication mechanism of UTMS,
UMTS-AKA, as its core authentication element.
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The logic of the protocol is as follows: during the ﬁrst interaction between the user and the
mobile operator (e.g. when the mobile phone is turned on for the ﬁrst time or when the mobile
radios are enabled) the end user provides some sort of biometric material (possibly a voice
sample) to the phone (speciﬁcally to the SIM) which calculates a key k; the key is sent to the
mobile operator which produces a new key k based on the one received from the SIM; the
mobile operator sends back k to the SIM. From that point forward, any time the user wants
to make a call, they will provide a biometric sample that will be used by the SIM to locally
generate k that will be used by UMTS-AKA to authenticate the SIM against the mobile operator
(Dimitriadis and Shaikh, 2007).
BIO3G is an interesting approach that addresses some problems of the authentication biometric
techniques: storage of biometric material (i.e. it does not store any). However, BIO3G also
faces some difﬁculties. Variable quality of biometric material can yield a non-compatible key
for subsequent user authentication, the limited processing power on some phones being the
cause. However, due to the development of authentication techniques and the capacity of cur-
rent mobile phones, those limitations are less relevant compared to when BIO3G was proposed
more than ten years ago. Dimitriadis and Shaikh (2007) evaluate the compliance of BIO3G
using formal process algebra Communication Sequential Processes (CSP) (Hoare, 1978) and
Rank Functions (Schneider, 1998).
1.3.5 Securing biometric templates transmission
Biometric features for authentication over communication networks, such as an individual’s
biometric print (template), may be stolen either in transit or from the system database. Several
solutions have been proposed to address this concern. BIO3G completely avoids both trans-
mission and remote storage of biometric prints (Dimitriadis and Shaikh, 2007). Kikuchi et al.
(2010) proposed the use of a zero-knowledge proof protocol, which allows a user to prove that
they have some valid piece of biometric data, without actually revealing it. They proposed
two protocols to achieve their purpose: The Private-Cosine and the Private-Euclid based on
the cosine correlation and the Euclidian distance respectively. With reasonable computational
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resources, both protocols allow remote authentication without revealing any private data. In
terms of accuracy, the biometric results are not satisfactory, however, for the purpose of this
literature survey we are only interested in the description of a feasible secure remote biometric
authentication. Kuseler et al. (2010) proposed a layer authentication architecture, eBiomet-
rics, to be implemented as an application on mobile phones. eBiometrics pretends to be an
application that offers authentication services to other applications through the control of all
matching sensors (e.g. camera, ﬁngerprint reader and microphone). eBiometrics would pre-
process, analyse and deliver results on raw biometric pieces of information. It can be either
implemented as a local (on the mobile phone itself) self-contained system or as the client of a
hosted application.
Johnson et al. (2014) presented a different approach to the issue of compromised biometric
templates. Their proposal is based on the concept of vault veriﬁcation introduced by Wilber
et al. (2012), which consists in separating the biometric template into several pieces, scram-
bling them with fake pieces of biometric data and then putting them back together. The ob-
jective is to obfuscate the real information making it very difﬁcult for an attacker to identify
the authentic data in the biometric template. Subsequently, in similar papers, Wilber and Boult
(2012) and Johnson et al. (2014) argued that in the context of voice authentication over re-
mote networks, even if the biometric template is stolen, the risk of a successful attack can be
minimised by using random authentication with short phrases as a complement of the main
authentication process. They also proposed to add random pass phrases to the real template
in order to use them to conﬁrm the identity of the true speaker. This technique has the added
value of mixing text dependent (a pass phrase) and text independent (a random phrase) audio
responses that may mitigate reported vulnerabilities of both text dependent and independent
approaches.
1.3.6 Related projects
Finally, to close this review, several authors developed approaches to solve different aspects of
the problem of secured remote biometric authentication over communication networks. These
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proposals were not reviewed extensively to avoid making this chapter overly long. The reader
is invited to explore the original articles for further details.
• Li and Hwang (2010) suggestd the use of one-way hash functions, biometric veriﬁcation
and smart cards.
• Agbinya et al. (2011) proposed a Multimodal Identity Management System that fuses ﬁn-
gerprints and face recognition using neural networks based biometric techniques.
• Xi et al. (2011) proposed a client server biometric authentication protocol oriented to mo-
bile environment; it uses encrypted ﬁngerprints (based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography)
and a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) to protect biometric authentication sessions through
insecure mobile networks.
• To avoid user information to be extrapolated from biometric data (e.g. genetic information
or diseases), Abidin and Mitrokotsa (2014) proposed an enhancement to the privacy pre-
serving biometric authentication protocol (PPBA) proposed by Bringer et al. (2007) using
the Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem based on homomorphic encryption. They improved
the PPBA security by using two secret keys against the system biometric sensor during the
veriﬁcation stage.
• Using homomorphic encryption and a similarity scored based on Squared Euclidian Dis-
tance between the query vector (the analysed biometric veriﬁcation sample) and the bio-
metric print, Wong and Kim (2012) claimed that a biometric veriﬁcation can be completed
without exposing the original data.
• Traore et al. (2014) proposed Behavioural biometrics. A Bayesian network model is ap-
plied to remote keyboard and mouse events to create their particular usage characteristics
of a speciﬁc user. Their experimentation yields a EER of 8.21% on a limited subset.
• Nomura et al. (2015) took the heartbeat waveform as their biometric measure; they anal-
yse the properties of an electrocardiogram (ECG) to identify a subject with the dynamic
variability of the ECG which, reportedly, keeps unique the features of the subject. The
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reported positive authentication rate is not that encouraging at around 80%, however, since
wearable devices could be adapted to read ECG signals providing a very unique biometric
identiﬁcation, a great potential is seen in this type of approach.
• Saevanee et al. (2015) used multimodal biometrics over mobile networks: linguistic anal-
ysis, key strokes dynamics and behavioural proﬁling to reach a reduction of 91% in the
rate of spoofed authentication. The key element of this study is the demonstration that,
even though one single biometric entity may not be trustworthy, the combination of several
biometric measures can leverage positive results; furthermore, it opens the door to the pos-
sibility of using continuous data entries for an equally continuous authentication through
the length of a user-to-user interaction.
All the works mentioned in this chapter focus on characteristics of the biometric process and
the process to provide biometric payloads and collect the results. None of them has leveraged
an already accepted communication mechanism to facilitate these processes. Next chapter




Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is an application layer telecommunications control protocol.
It has been designed to handle signalling for multimedia sessions: establishment, modiﬁca-
tion and termination. SIP is used with other protocols, notably the Session Description Pro-
tocol (SDP), to transport multimedia content (including VoIP, images, video, etc.). SIP can
be considered as a framework for the deployment and development of communication services
(Rosenberg and Schulzrinne, 2006). SIP provides all actors of a communication exchange with
a set of rules for establishing a session. SIP is text-based encoded. In practice this means that
SIP is easy to read and understand. Any protocol that SIP uses (e.g. SDP) is expected to have
the following features (Martinez, 2008a):
• Clear indication of supported media.
• The availability of the media through the session.
• Transport information for the media itself (IP and port to which the media packets should
be sent).
In its basic form, SIP can be used as a peer-to-peer protocol where endpoint devices (called
User Agents (UAs)) have a high level of autonomy. A complete exchange of data can be
entirely processed between two UAs without the need for any third-party component. Figure
2.1 illustrates the basic building blocks of a SIP communication exchange: each participant
is called a User Agent (UA), each UA can take the logical role of a client (UAC)or a server
(UAS), the client is the one initiating the conversation requesting something and the server is
in charge of replying to that client’s requests (Martinez, 2008a).
As extrapolated from Figure 2.1, UAs are ﬂexible in nature and can take different roles. It is
customary to deﬁne the SIP functions in two main groups: UA clients (UAC) and UA servers
(UAS). An endpoint usually supports both groups of functions.
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Figure 2.1 Basic SIP Communication.
In practice UA to UA communications are processed by SIP-aware devices such as proxy
servers, soft-switches, SBCs, etc. All intermediate components facilitate services and en-
able UAs to communicate over different IP networks. In general, UAs initiate and control
dialogs while intermediate devices provide routing and offer extra services. Under certain con-
ditions, intermediate devices can also act as UAs. When required, potential confusions are to
be avoided by referring to the UAs as SIP clients or servers, where the client is the entity orig-
inating the request and the server is the entity receiving and processing the request (Martinez,
2008a).
Figure 2.2 SIP Basic Trapezoid.
21
Figure 2.2 illustrates the most basic scenario of a SIP communication establishment between
two UAs located in different networks. The initial request is sent by Alice’s UA through her
local SIP proxy; this proxy sends the request to Bob’s SIP Proxy (either directly or through
intermediate SIP proxies); eventually the request reaches Bob’s UA which reply follows the
same logical path backwards to reach Alice’s UA. If everything works as expected, a direct
communication is established between both UAs. This scenario is the simplest of the cases.
It can very well happen that the proxies are kept in the path of both the signalling and media
sessions, or only the signalling goes through the SIP proxies whilst the media establishes direct
communication or goes through different proxies specialised in handling the speciﬁc payload
type (Steffen et al., 2004).
UAs are identiﬁed by a SIP Universal Resource Identiﬁer (URI). A SIP URI must conform to
the rules established by RFC 3986 and must have enough information to establish and keep
a communication session with the UA (Berners-Lee et al., 2005). An example of a SIP URI
would be: sip:wilmar.perez@ens.etsmtl.ca.
A SIP URI can be virtually identical to a regular email address. A more generalised description
of the SIP URI format would be sip:userID@host:port, where the user ID is an optional com-
ponent which uniquely identiﬁes a resource (a user, a group of users, an extension, a service,
etc.) and the host is either the Fully Qualiﬁed Domain Name (FQDN) or the IP the resource is
associated with. Finally, the port is only used when a non-default port is used for the commu-
nication establishment. SIP URIs that provide identiﬁcation to resources to be contacted over a
secured channel (e.g. Transport Layer Security (TLS)) change their format to SIPS URI, note
the S after the SIP identiﬁer. SIP URIs have other interesting properties such as the generic use
of URIs to identify secondary resources for a given already identiﬁed resource. For instance,
starting from a single URI, a user could be linked to his email, phone number, web site, etc.
(Schulzrinne, 2001).
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Figure 2.2 shows how a proxy server entity is used to facilitate the communication between
two UAs. SIP scenarios include the use of several facilitating entities or servers. These servers
are usually named based on their function:
• Proxies: SIP Proxy Servers mainly determine where to send signalling messages (i.e. route
SIP messages). Given their location in the communication path, SIP Proxies also are often
given the task of performing authentication and authorisation. A SIP Proxy can participate
during call establishment or for the entire length of the call, which would depend on the
level of call control desired and the topology of the network. For network to network com-
munication the SIP proxy is usually required during the entire communication. SIP proxies
can manipulate SIP headers to redirect or modify the characteristics of an interaction. Each
UA needs to be notiﬁed of its corresponding SIP proxy or proxies. This notiﬁcation is usu-
ally accomplished by direct conﬁguration or by using network conﬁguration protocols (e.g.
Dynamic Host Control Protocol - DHCP) (Subramanian and Dutta, 2013).
• Location: Location Servers keep track of the current location of all UAs in the system.
They usually keep records of registered clients (i.e. UAs) in a local database. Each record
holds an UA ID and its last known network location. A Location Server provides UA
location information for other UAs. Note that a location service is not a SIP entity, it is a
general service that, as mentioned, keeps records of the UA location without any impact on
the SIP signalling or any associated payload. (Ott, 2001)
• Registrar: SIP Registrar Servers are entities that handle the registration of UAs. When
a Registrar server allows a UA request to be registered, it notiﬁes an associated location
server that keeps a log of all UA whereabouts. When an UA changes location, it regis-
ters through the registrar in the corresponding zone which updates the record in the re-
spective location server. UAs periodically send register messages to update their location
(Schulzrinne, 2001).
• Redirect: SIP Redirect Servers provide alternative URI information to an UA sending a
request. For instance, they may force trafﬁc going to a speciﬁc domain to be handled by an
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auxiliary server in the case of system failure. SIP Redirect Servers do not initiate requests
or accept calls which makes them very efﬁcient for handling high loads. However, their
use is limited to a very speciﬁc set of functions (Osterhout, 2003).
Among the basic SIP entities there is another widely used SIP element known as a Back-to-
Back User Agent (B2BUA). A B2BUA is a special type of SIP entity able to act as a different UA
(UAC or UAS) for both ends of a SIP call. A B2BUA takes a SIP request, processes it following
an internal programmatic logic and then creates a new SIP request based on the original one
plus relevant programming rules. A B2BAUA can be thought as a pair of UAs linked by a
programmed logic. B2BUAs are also known as SIP application servers. B2BUAs are primarily
used to modify signalling properties and routing calls based on high-level logic (Zave et al.,
2009). Figure 2.3 illustrates the design principle behind a B2BUA.
Figure 2.3 B2BUA.
SIP has become very popular in part because of the formatting of its messages. Unlike other
communication protocols, SIP messages are text-based (they use the UTF-8 charset and follow
the Internet Message Standard as deﬁned in RFC 2822 (Resnick, 2001)). SIP Messages are
classiﬁed as requests (UAC to UAS) and responses (UAS to UAC). SIP messages are, in form,
similar to the requests and responses of the Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP) 1.1. as
described in RFC2616 (Fielding et al., 1999). However, SIP is not an extension of HTTP;
SIP and HTTP simply share the same type of formatting and the same working philosophy of
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simpliﬁed requests and responses. This proposal is SIP-dependent so to understand what is
expected of SIP messages a summary of their main characteristics follows.
2.1 SIP Requests
SIP requests always have three elements: a method name (REGISTER, INVITE, ACK, CAN-
CEL, BYE and OPTIONS), a request URI, and the protocol version. In general, the format of
a SIP request is Method[ ]Request URI[ ]Protocol version.
For instance, INVITE sip: wilmar.perez@ens.etsmtl.ca SIP 2.0 is a valid SIP request.
The behaviour of every SIP request depends of the method being used. Most relevant charac-
teristics of SIP Requests Methods are shown next.
REGISTER. It is used by the UA to associate its public identity to its current location (contact
address) through a registrar server. The request must include the public identity (e.g.
wilmar.perez@ens.etsmtl.ca) and its current location (e.g. wilmar.perez@172.25.34.10).
When the registration process is successful, an entry with the appropriate information is
added to the location server. The UA needs to send a new registration request before the
time-to-live of the registered entry expires.
INVITE. Due to its ﬂexibility, the INVITE has become the most used SIP request method. In
its more basic form, a SIP INVITE is used when a UAC initiates a session. An INVITE
request contains the UAC public identity. After an INVITE the UAC expects either a
success or a provisional response. The message exchange initiated by an INVITE is
known as a SIP DIALOG. The INVITE is also used for the parties to agree on the codecs
to use and the IP and ports where media (e.g. RTP) trafﬁc will be exchanged. SIP itself
is not intended to be used for media characteristics deﬁnition. However, it can carry SDP
information as body content. SDP, on the other hand, is speciﬁcally designed to describe
the media properties of a communication session. (Handley et al., 2006)
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A particularly useful SIP characteristic is the possibility of modifying many of the initial
dialogue parameters. Within an existing SIP dialogue, a new INVITE can be exchanged
between the parties to modify session characteristics (e.g. change media destination).
This type of request is known as a Re-INVITE.
Arguably, the INVITE is the most important type of SIP message. It can start a com-
munication request and it can be used to modify the parameters of a communication in
progress: change routing, change types of media, add parties to the conversation, etc. For
the ﬁrst communication establishment, an INVITE relies on a SIP proxy service to ﬁnd
the right party and its respective location. A SIP resource can register itself from mul-
tiple locations against a given SIP Proxy. A user, for instance, can register a SIP phone
on a mobile and a computer at the same time, notiﬁcations are sent to both registered
endpoints.
ACK. It is a special type of SIP request used by the three-way handshake implemented in
the INVITE method. An UA generates an ACK when it receives the ﬁnal response
corresponding to an INVITE.
CANCEL. This request is used to interrupt a pending transaction. Upon reception of a CAN-
CEL request the UAS simply acknowledges it with a 200 OK and cancels any pending
transaction from the corresponding dialogue. The UAS also notiﬁes the UAC about the
cancellation of the original transaction with a 487 response.
BYE. It is mostly used to simply terminate an existing session.
OPTIONS. This request allows a UAC to query a UAS to know of its capabilities (e.g. sup-
ported methods, codecs, etc.). The main objective of an OPTIONS request is for the
UAC to know how the build a subsequent INVITE based on the actual UAS capabilities.
2.2 SIP Responses
There can be more than one SIP to a single request: one ﬁnal response and, alternatively,
several provisional ones. Responses are identiﬁed by a three-digit status code that indicates
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the result of a request. The three-digit code is intended to be used as a programmatic guide for
SIP-based applications. Status codes are divided in six groups:
• 1xx: Provisional (task in progress.)
• 2xx: Success.
• 3xx: Redirection (a different set of actions need to be done to complete the request.)
• 4xx: Client error (the request is not valid or is not supported by the server.)
• 5xx: Server error (the request seems to be valid but the server was not able process it.)
• 6xx: Global failure
The format of a Response is as follows:
Protocol version /[ ] Status-Code /[ ] Reason phrase -> e.g. : SIP 2.0 200 OK
Header Fields:
Header Fields provide detailed information of requests and responses and their respective body
contents. Each Header Field has a ﬁeld name, a ﬁeld value (which may contain an optional dis-
play name for visualization purposes) and, optionally, a parameter (ﬁeld name: Display Name
<ﬁeld value>; parameter name = parameter value). The ﬁeld value is any of the previously
seen requests and responses. A simple example would be:
From: Wilmar Perez <sip:3738@172.25.34.10>; tag=074e6845296ae42ba
A short description of the mainheader ﬁelds is shown below:
FROM. It indicates the AOR (logical identity) of the UA initiating the request.
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TO. It indicates the AOR (logical identity) of the recipient. Notably, the To Header Field is
not modiﬁed by any intermediate proxy.
CALL-ID. It is an unique automatic identiﬁer to link messages within the same SIP Dialogue.
VIA. It is added by each SIP proxy in the communication path. It indicates the routing path a
response needs to follow. It must include the transport protocol used to send the message
and the sender network information. It may also have two optional ﬁelds: branch to
identify messages within the same transaction and received which shows the true origin
of a request.
CONTACT. An UA can provide a SIP URI that can be used by other parties to establish future
contacts. Since VIA headers can potentially be stripped off when a speciﬁc SIP proxy is
no longer required in the path, a CONTACT header is a reliable way of keeping the UA
information during the whole SIP Dialog.
RECORD-ROUTE and ROUTE. These two headers are used together to force responses to
go through a speciﬁc route. A SIP Proxy can introduce a RECORD-ROUTE to force
future requests in the same SIP dialogue to go through a speciﬁc route. When the re-
questing UA receives a response with a RECORD-ROUTE request header, it inserts the
received value inside a ROUTE header to force subsequent responses to go through a
path of speciﬁed proxies.
CSEQ (Command Sequence). This header consists of a sequence number and method. The
number is used to keep a sequence of end-to-end requests in a SIP dialogue. The method
is used to keep a correlation of requests and responses within the same transaction.
MAX-FORWARDS. The Max-Forward Header deﬁnes the maximum number of proxies that
a request can traverse to get to its destination.
There are additional relevant headers and characteristics of the SIP protocol that are not central
to the functioning of the communication. Further details and information can be found in RFC
3621. (Rosenberg et al., 2002).
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To understand the elements involved in a SIP exchange it is useful to illustrate the concept
with a classical communication example: Alice and Bob. Alice wants to establish a voice
communication with Bob whose endpoints are in at least one foreign network. As explained
above, SIP uses a three-way handshake protocol to complete the session establishment. When
Alice wants to establish a session, she sends an INVITE with the desired characteristics of the
session, including the media and media transmission properties. Bob’s endpoint immediately
replies with a 100 Trying to let Alice know that it is an actual entity capable of SIP communi-
cation. Bob’s endpoint also sends a 180 Ringing to indicate that there has been a contact and
that action from Bob is expected to complete the establishment. Once Bob answers, a 200 OK
message is sent to Alice to indicate the request has been accepted, to which she would reply
with ACK. This ACK request does not require a response. Media transmission starts. The set
of events is illustrated in Figure 2.4.
Figure 2.4 Three-way handshake.
Providing the communication establishment is successful, a simpliﬁed message exchange is
illustrated in Figure 2.5.
A frequently used tool is the SIP trapezoid. It can be used to illustrate the message exchange
between all SIP entities in the communication path. A basic example of a SIP trapezoid is
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Figure 2.5 Basic SIP Message Exchange.
shown in Figure 2.6, where a successful basic session establishment and media exchange are
represented.
Figure 2.6 Basic SIP Trapezoid.
Even though Figure 2.6 shows initial communication establishment being routed through the
proxies whilst subsequent SIP messages and media are exchanged directly, it could also happen
that all communications ﬂow exclusively through the proxies.
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Understanding SIP trapezoids allows for easier understanding of SIP traces. In Figures 2.4
and 2.5 Alice and Bob are part of the same SIP domain and no proxies are required. On the
other hand, Figure 2.6 includes the concept of proxies, which implies that Alice and Bob are
on different SIP domains.
A testing scenario was conﬁgured to recreate and test SIP communication for this proposal. In
the test environment Alice and Bob are in different locations as shown in Figure 2.7. Bob is at
a remote location, connected through the Internet and establishing a VPN tunnel to the location
where the softswitch is; Alice is collocated to the telephony switch. The tests on this proposal
use FreeSwitch1 as the softswitch, Linphone2 as the endpoints and Cisco Any Connect3 as the
VPN client.
Figure 2.7 Physical Diagram (Bob and Alice).
Figures 2.8 shows a SIP trace of the message exchange between Alice and Bob as seen from





Figure 2.8 SIP Flowfor Alice and Bob (Bob Side).
The ﬁrst SIP INVITE is sent by Bob’s UA. Since Bob does not know how to contact Alice, he
sends the request to its own register server that takes the role of a SIP proxy for the communi-
cation.
Figure 2.9 SIP INVITE (Bob to Proxy).
As shown in Figure 2.10, the SIP proxy lets Bob know that it is trying to complete the requested
event.
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Figure 2.10 SIP Trying (Proxy to Bob).
The SIP Proxy then realises that authentication is needed before serving any request from Bob.
It sends an authentication request to Bob’s UA. The SIP proxy response includes a challenge
along with basic information to build an appropriate SIP INVITE request as shown in Figure
2.11.
Figure 2.11 Authentication Request (Proxy to Bob).
Bob acknowledges the request.
Figure 2.12 Request Acknowledgement (Bob to Proxy).
Bob sends a new SIP INVITE with the required authentication information. Figure 2.13 shows
the new INVITE.
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Figure 2.13 SIP Invite with Authentication (Bob to Proxy).
Once the use of the service has been granted, the proxy sends Bob a new indication that the
process is going ahead.
Figure 2.14 SIP Trying response (Proxy to Bob).
The proxy notiﬁes Bob’s UA that a session is in progress. Since Alice’s UA has not been yet
contacted, the telephony provider (which happens to be the same SIP proxy in this particular
case) adds a SDP body indicating an upcoming artiﬁcial ring back tone or announcement. This
is done in a 183 message as shown in Figure 2.15.
An INVITE, shown in Figure 2.16 is ﬁnally dispatched to Alice. Comparing against the ones
in ﬁgures 2.9 and 2.13, some characteristics are worth highlighting:
• From and To headers are no different from the original INVITE.
• The Contact header is modiﬁed. It points at the softswitch SIP module handling the event.
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Figure 2.15 183 Session in Progress (Proxy to Bob).
• Media attributes in the SDP are limited to PCMU, PCMA and Opus as supported by all
parties.
Figure 2.16 SIP INVITE (Proxy to Alice).
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Alice’s UA dispatches response codes signalling that it is, ﬁrst, trying to complete the request
and then informing that the user is being notiﬁed. Figures 2.17 and 2.18 show the respective
SIP Trying (100) and SIP Ringing (100) messages.
Figure 2.17 SIP Trying response (Alice to Proxy).
Figure 2.18 SIP Ringing (Alice to Proxy).
The proxy notiﬁes Bob of the successful reception of the message. Figure 2.19 shows the
corresponding 200 OK message.
Bob UA acknowledges the notiﬁcation. Authentication information is included along with
every SIP message from Bob as shown in Figure 2.20
Alice’s UA, notiﬁes of the successful message delivery as illustrated in Figure 2.21.
The proxy then responds with an acknowledgement to Alice as shown in Figure 2.22.
At this point the communication path has been fully established and regular media (RTP in this
example) ﬂow starts or continues (early media could have been already sent) between the UA.
In this particular testing layout the softswitch acts as the media gateway as well as the router
(i.e. all media trafﬁc necessarily traverses the softswitch).
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Figure 2.19 SIP OK (Proxy to Bob).
Figure 2.20 ACK (Bob to Proxy).
There are many possible subsequent SIP messages: one of the parties may be put on hold, an
additional media channel could be added, another party may join the call, etc. In the sample
interaction Bob simply decides to terminate the call. Bob’s UA notiﬁes the proxy that replies
with a 200 OK and, in turn, notiﬁes Alice, who also replies with a 200 OK. A summary of
these four messages is shown in Figure 2.23. This concludes the message analysis exercise.
SIP as a signalling protocol which is proven to be clear and rigorous to establish trustworthy
communication paths between parties. Although the process seems lengthy and cumbersome,
in practice most of the heavy lifting is done by any chosen SIP framework. The base ﬂow of
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Figure 2.21 OK (Alice to Proxy).
Figure 2.22 ACK (Proxy to Alice).
the Alice and Bob message exchange is used to understand SIPBIO messaging ﬂow later in
this document.
Figure 2.23 SIP Dialog termination (Bob to Proxy, Proxy to
Bob, Proxy to Alice, Alice to Proxy).
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It is important to remember that SIP is a layered protocol that suits independent development
of sections or functionalities. Notably, not every UA implements all layers. SIP layers can be
summarized as follows:
Syntax and encoding. Deﬁnes how requests and responses are written.
Transport. Deﬁnes how UAs send and receive requests and responses.
Transaction. It can be thought as the set of client / server message exchanges needed to handle
a speciﬁc request.
Transaction user. It is basically any SIP entity except for a stateless proxy (a message for-
warder that does not actively participate in the communication).
So far, the concepts of SIP entities services have been presented without much explanation of
their true nature. They are logical components, the former responds and acts to the logic of
requests while the later delivers extra enhanced functionality for the UA. SIP services are most
commonly implemented on a B2BUA due to their ﬂexibility to modify signalling and routing
as required.
This chapter has presented how a basic SIP implementation can manage the requirements of
most multimedia sessions: establishment, maintenance, and ﬁnalisation. However, there are
cases deemed very difﬁcult to handle with the default SIP implementation. SIP can be adapted
to such cases through extensions as deﬁned in RFC 4485 (Rosenberg and Schulzrinne, 2006).
The process of evaluating the need or suitability of a new SIP extension is discussed in the next
chapter with some examples selected for their similarity (or complementarity) to SIPBIO.
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2.3 SIP extensions
Previous sections displayed the power and ﬂexibility of SIP to establish interactive communi-
cations between endpoints across networks. SIP ﬂexibility comes, in part, from the ability to
extend core functionalities through extensions. These extensions are used to deﬁne new meth-
ods, header ﬁelds, body types and parameters. Many have been proposed with some being
widely used whilst others have never been adopted. This section introduces the guidelines to
create SIP extensions and reviews some of those extensions from which SIPBIO borrows logic
and functionalities.
2.3.1 SIP extensions guidelines
In RFC 4485, Rosenberg and Schulzrinne (2006) proposed a set of guidelines to author them.
The aim of these guidelines is to be used as a reference for extension developers on SIP archi-
tectural concepts. Clarity on the SIP architecture helps developers to evaluate the viability of a
proposed extension. An overview of the proposed guidelines is shown next.
SIP Solution Space. SIP is a protocol for initiating, modifying, and terminating interactive
sessions. This implies that SIP excels at ﬁnding remote parties to communicate with. SIP
locates those remote parties through discovery. Subsequently, SIP can register sessions
and fork communications. A key factor is the fact that SI is independent of the media
session that it establishes.
SIP Architectural Model. Every proposed SIP extension must not violate any of the base
protocol architectural concepts. Some of them are:
• Session Independence. The details of the media session are independent of the ses-
sion establishment: path independence.
• Multi-provider and multi-hop. SIP expects messages to traverse through different
networks.
• Transactional. All messages have a request / response model.
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• Proxies can ignore bodies. An extension cannot rely on a SIP Proxy analysing and
acting based on the body of a message. SIP Proxies are to ignore the body content.
• Proxies do not need to understand the method. No extension can rely on new methods
that need to be understood by proxies.
• An INVITE must be self-compliant. Any SIP message must be susceptible of being
processed. Behaviour based on collecting information across several INVITES and
RE-INVITES must not be used.
• Generality is preferred over efﬁciency. It is preferable to offer capabilities covering a
large spectrum of cases rather than having specialized capabilities for a small subset
of scenarios.
• The Request URI is the primary key for forwarding. All forwarding operations must
be guided by the Request URI which indicates the desired recipient of the message.
• Heterogeneity. No extension should have the constraint of only working if all devices
support it. The extension must handle the cases when there are non-compliant UAs.
• Other general requirements. Any proposed SIP extension must be backward com-
patible with base SIP implementations. Extensions should prefer default SIP security
mechanisms. The deﬁnitions of each extension should comply with SIP terminology,
syntactic, semantic and document formalities as stated in RFC 4485.
One of the restrictions previously presented (proxy agnostic or independence) comes as an
advantage. Since proxies do not need to understand extensions behaviour, the design of the
extension needs only to account for UA requests and responses. A de facto rule for any SIP
implementation is that when sending requests, the protocol must be very strict, however, when
receiving them the implementation must be ﬂexible to deal with situations when there is in-
compatibility. (Martinez, 2008b)
SIP can be extended in different ways: new headers, new methods, new content types. One
of the most important things to consider during the design is how to handle the cases of in-
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compatibility. Some of the recommended ways to deal with incompatibilities on different SIP
extension types are shown next.
New headers. The easiest approach to prevent incompatibility issues on new headers is to
avoid using them altogether if the requested party does not support the new deﬁnition.
An UAC can be proactive and enquire the UAS for what headers it supports. This can
be done by sending an OPTIONS request before any initial INVITE. This allows for the
construction of the INVITE with only the supported headers or the cancellation of the
request.
An UAC can also tell the UAS that a speciﬁc header is supported. When using this
strategy, the UAS reply includes the supported header. If, then, the UAC replies without
header support information (i.e. a regular plain request), the UAS may try replying
including the header it wants to use. If the UAC replies with a non-supported error
message, the UAS can rebuild a standard request without including the header. Instead,
if the UAS does require the use of a speciﬁc header to force an extension, it can reply
with an extension required (421) message. This behaviour is implemented using Require
and Proxy-Require. The UAC use these headers to require extension support. If the UAS
(or the proxy) does not support any of the required extensions, they reply with a bad
extension (420) message. The UAC needs to handle the situation by either defaulting to
plain SIP or stopping the dialogue.
Header extensions are deﬁned through unique identiﬁers know as option tags. They
are commonly used to deﬁne nonstandard extensions. An extension that has not been
approved for the SIP standard track can, nevertheless, be invoked by using the private
headers session P-Headers. This approach is primarily employed for in house or private
applications where general compatibility is not needed and the behaviour of the protocol
can be easily controlled.
New methods. The use of new methods is less ﬂexible than the use of new headers. The UAC
and the UAS must agree on supporting any new method. Agreement can be achieved by
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having the UAC checking against the UAS before sending the ﬁrst request. As previously
explicated for headers, either an OPTIONS or the publishing of a list supported methods
in the initial request, are mechanisms an UAC can employ. In the latter, an ALLOW
header is appended to the request.
New content. New content is handled similarly to new methods. An UAC only uses a new
content type once it conﬁrms that the UAS supports it. An UAC may send an OPTIONS
message, then the UAS response might include Accept, Accept-Encoding or Accept-
Language headers to represent that a content type, encoding or language are supported.
An UAC may also send a request to indicate its own supported content types to which
the corresponding UAS should reply reporting which one, if any, it supports or prefers.
Optionally an UAC request may also include a Content-Disposition header to label the
content type as optional (Martinez, 2008b).
2.3.2 Representative SIP extensions
After a revision on the basics of extending SIP, a review of some representative SIP extensions
follows. These SIP extensions have been chosen because they are currently being used in
commercial applications and are relevant to the SIPBIO protocol.
2.3.2.1 SIPREC
SIPREC is one of the most successful SIP extensions. It aims at enabling recording of me-
dia communications. SIPREC was developed as a joint effort of several telecommunications
companies: Cisco4, Nice Systems5, Genesys6, Avaya7 and Unify8. SIPREC is deﬁned in RFC







SIPREC ﬁts especially well within the context of operation of Session Border Controllers
(SBC). An SBC is a highly specialized ﬁrewall device that allows proper routing and transcod-
ing of SIP communication between different networks. They usually sit at the border between
an ISP or Telephony Service Provider and a corporate data / telephony network. Since all com-
munications necessarily pass through them, they are in a privileged position to intercept and
manipulate packets as required (Rehor et al., 2011).
A review of the SIPREC architecture as described in RFC7245 by Hutton et al. (2014) follows.
The basic component block of any recording system is the ability to obtain a copy of the media
to be recorded without disrupting the original intended communication. Recording of VoIP
calls usually requires obtaining a copy of the original RTP stream associated with a metadata
set. SIPREC deﬁnes two UAs: logical functions Session Recording Client (SRC) and Session
Recording Server (SRS). The SRC purposefully sends media packets to the SRS. The SRS
should be able to concurrently receive media and identify its metadata from multiple sources.
The role of SRC can be taken by any device capable of acting as a UA: SIP Phone, SBC, SIP
Media gateway. Any UA must be able to deliver media and metadata in real time to the SRS.
The recording session should be independent of the original communication session being
recorded (Hutton et al., 2014). SIPREC can provide a recording indication in the SIP requests
and responses of the recorded communication session (Kyzivat et al., 2016).
There are several possible topological distributions for SIPREC enabled systems. Only the
two most widely used distributions are discussed in this document. In the ﬁrst topological
distribution (shown in Figure 2.24) a Back-to-Back User Agent (B2BUA) acts as the SRC.
This is usually the case of the SBC-based recording systems. Either the SRC or the SRS may
decide to start a recording session by sending an INVITE to the other party. Such an INVITE
must contain enough information for the receiving party to understand that the session will be
initiated with recordability. The sender must also prevent the session from being sent to an
unintended UA. The SRC may notify UA A and B that their session is being recorded.
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Figure 2.24 B2BUA as SRC.
A second SIPREC topology distribution is built when one of the UA takes the SRC role as
illustrated in Figure 2.25. It is the responsibility of the SIPREC-enabled UA to send both
media and metadata to the SRS. The recording session can be initiated by the UA or by the
SRS, depending on the solution design (Kyzivat et al., 2016).
Recording session establishment is completed in a similar way in either topology. In both
cases media characteristics are negotiated through a regular SIP process. As noted, the SRC
or the SRS can initiate the recording session. The process of communication establishment
is very similar (and surprisingly simple) in either case. It is outlined in ﬁgures 2.26 and 2.27
(Ravindran and Kyzivat, 2016).
When the media is replicated, it can be mixed or separated into two media streams: one for
the caller and the other for the receiver (Ravindran and Kyzivat, 2016). This ability is key for
voice biometrics where each party RTP stream needs to be clearly identiﬁed.
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Figure 2.25 UA as SRC.
Figure 2.26 SRC initiated recording.
Besides providing media content, the SRC is also responsible for providing metadata to the
SRS. This is usually achieved through a series of metadata snapshots (similar to call states).
The ﬁrst snapshot is sent on the initial INVITE. All subsequent updates are sent as Re-INVITE
or UPDATE messages. All metadata is transported in the body of the messages. A special case
would be the media stream attributes present in the SDP of the recording session. Metadata
is generated by a predeﬁned set of constituent block classes that serve as the constructor of
the protocol objects. These blocks constitute the base of the recording call ﬂows as deﬁned by
Kyzivat et al. (2016).
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Figure 2.27 SRS initiated recording.
SIPREC has already inspired the development of related protocols. The one that has gained
most recognition is the one proposing the recording ofMessage Session Relay Protocol (MSRP)
sessions. This Internet draft proposes using SIPREC to enable recording of text messages on
MSRP. The recording is achieved by deﬁning a new MIME type (media type) to wrap mes-
sages in a MSRP communication session. However, the latest reported state of the document
proposal is an early draught of unknown viability (Yan and Kyzivat, 2015).
2.3.2.2 SIP Extension for payments support
With the increased popularity of streaming technologies, there is a pressing need for an easy
way to charge customers for the use of multimedia services. The most popular mode of access-
ing multimedia streaming services is through subscriptions to a company that provides media
channels or speciﬁc pieces of multimedia content in a pay-per-use fashion. Subscribers pay
a monthly fee or a ﬂat price. Access control is based on the number of concurrent sessions,
number of downloads, streaming times and, possibly, geo-localisation. In all cases, subscribers
are required to have a different account per multimedia provider (Friedlander, 2015).
A SIP extension to support payments is analysed in this section. Familiarity with this proposal
helps clarifying some of the requirements of a SIP extension to support biometric authentica-
tion.
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Ruiz-Martinez et al. (2016) propose a SIP extension to handle payments in a generic way.
They deﬁne new headers, tags and contents for the body part of the message. Notably, this
SIP extension proposal meets requirements for Digital Rights Management (DRM), supports
negotiation through the offer / answer model and allows price-to-quality differences in the
initial offer and on the additional payments whilst the session is still in progress. SIP payments
must comply with, at least, the requirements listed next.
• Association of payment information with multimedia session description.
• Price offering based on quality.
• Support of different payment methods and price differentiation per method.
• Price negotiation.
• Receipt processing and handling.
• Loyalty information.
• Keep number of connections at a minimum.
As it is usual in SIP, the offer can start by the UAC sending an INVITE with a multimedia
description of the supported payment options. The UAC may send an OPTIONS request to the
UAS to ﬁnd out what methods are supported and, consequently, prepare the initial INVITE.
The UAS replies to the ﬁrst INVITE with a 200 OK containing a description of all supported
payment methods. The UAC completes the three-way handshake with an ACK indicating the
payment. All payment information is contained inside an XML structure. To support price
negotiation and processing of loyalty information, intermediate steps between the ﬁrst SIP IN-
VITE and the 200 OK can be inserted. These intermediate steps are implemented with the
use of 183 PRACK and OK(PRACK) messages. The UAC can easily indicate to the UAS if it
wants to start a price negotiation by using the optional tag negotiation in the INVITE. Provi-
sional responses PRACK and OK (PRACK) have been also extended to support the transport
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of the negotiation details in the also extended SDP body. Support for additional payments is
also included by using a new SIP MESSAGE method that contains the time left for the cur-
rent session as well as the information to start a new payment process. Figure 2.28 shows the
exchange of SIP messages for a typical use case.
Figure 2.28 Simple Payment Process.
In terms of security, the proposal does not include any speciﬁc capability relying instead on the
security of the payment protocol and the security mechanism of the underlying communication:
SIP authentication, IPsec, SIPS, TLS, etc.
The elements of the proposed extension can be summarized as follows:
SDP extension. SDP is used to specify the characteristics of the content to be transferred.
A new attribute, payment-info, was deﬁned to hold the information required during the
message exchange. The actual payment information is contained in the form of an XML
element with all the transaction details.
Option-tags. Standard SIP uses option-tags to inform about pieces of information that may
be needed or required during the multimedia session. There are three related head-
ers: Required, for those features that are mandatory to be supported; Supported, for
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those additional features that the UA also supports but are not mandatory; and Accept,
which indicates which headers are accepted. The payment proposal deﬁnes the following
option-tags:
• payment. It is mandatory for the Required header. If the UAC does not specify it, the
UAS will return a 402 Payment Required message.
• additionalpayments. It is an optional Supported header used for the UAC to indicate
that it wants to make additional payments at any point during the session.
• negotiation. It is an optional tag for both, the Required and the Supported headers. It
is used for the UAC to indicate that it wants to negotiate the price and / or the quality
of the media. For instance, in the case of music or video streams, the UAC may be
willing to sacriﬁce quality to save on price.
• application/sippayment. It is an optional tag in the Accept header used for a UA to
indicate that it supports exchange of payment information.
Application/sippayment content. It is a new proposed content type which is used to exchange
payment messages. It is deﬁned as an XML structure called PaymentInformation that
represents an element of the PaymentInformationType type (deﬁned as an XML schema).
These elements are included either as an attribute of the SDP content (payment-info) or
as the content itself (application/sippayment) of a SIP message in the payment exchange.
All elements in the XML schema are optional according to the need of the transaction.
By extending SIP and SDP, plus the deﬁnition of a new XML structure, this proposal constitutes
a solid alternative for a payment exchange system (Ruiz-Martinez et al., 2016).
SIPBIO leverages many of the concepts of this proposal, building upon it for the purpose of
biometrics.
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2.3.2.3 Other SIP extensions
The architectures of two SIP extensions: SIPREC and SIP Payment Support have been anal-
ysed. The way the SIP integration proposal works has been described above. These extensions
have been chosen because they reﬂect a similar theory of operation to that of SIPBIO. Due to
space constraints additional SIP extensions are not included in this review. However, a brief
mention of two more SIP extensions is presented to reinforce some of the concepts this pro-
posal relies on.
A proposal by Gurbani and Sun (2004), although already superseded by newer developments
in telecommunications, constitutes an interesting attempt to integrate traditional telephony and
digital services. Gurbani and Sun (2004), proposed an extension of the SIP protocol to support
telecommunications services. Their objective was to enhance cellular telephony to offer a
richer set of services. In 2004 those services were being offered by Internet-based operators.
At that time, mobile offers were mainly based on 2G and 2.5G (in some markets there was an
early introduction of 3G). It was generally thought that it was more reliable to offer services
based on the architecture of the mobile network. The offering of Internet-based services was
limited to the constraints of event-handling on the mobile section of the communication path.
An advantage of the approach was that no Internet connection was needed to access any covered
service. The proposed architecture achieves this level of isolation by separating Internet and
mobile-based services with an Event Manager that works like a proxy gateway service. The
system leverages entities called Detection Points to which Internet hosts subscribe in order to
receive events generated at the mobile side. Whenever an event occurred (e.g. a new call) the
Detection Point would be notiﬁed and the Event Manager (which is aware of all events) would
notify the Internet Host in its subscribers list (Gurbani and Sun, 2004).
To achieve a SIP compatible event management, this SIP extension proposes two new SIP
event packages and a new MIME type payload. The resulting extended protocol leverages SIP
asynchronous event notiﬁcation capabilities between entities: subscribers and notiﬁers. The
message exchange between subscribers and notiﬁers follows RFC 3265 (Roach, 2002). The
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newly deﬁned SIP event packages are labelled spirits.INDPs, which correspond to call events,
and spirits.user-proof which corresponds to all other types of events. The characteristics of the
events are passed as a payload in an XML formatted extended MIME type (application/spirits-
events+xml). It also deﬁnes a XML schema that represents the Detection Point and its associ-
ated parameters. Every time there is a message exchange (i.e. subscription, event notiﬁcation,
etc.) a XML payload is created holding all required information. XML has the advantage of
being, by design, easily extensible.
No further review is given of this proposal, the objective was to illustrate how SIP extensions
have been used to add additional functionality to SIP with the speciﬁc aim of replacing or
complementing existing communication protocols on carrier infrastructures.
The last SIP extension analysed in this review is the SIP Device Discovery in Future Service
Platforms. This proposal, intends to deliver customised media services using SIP for signaling
and service selection. The architecture is designed around a Service Delivery Platform. This
platform is tasked with providing requested services for UA. The proposal uses the possibility
of indicating UA capabilities in SIP as Huston et al. (2004) proposes in RFC 3840. Every
UA sends information as an XML payload. The proposal extends the OPTIONS method with
the ability to query the capabilities of a registered UA. It also extends the MESSAGE method
to carry the device and media descriptions. Finally, SIP headers are extended to distinguish
between extended and default methods. The description header is extended with a new ﬁeld
for mixed purposes as enumerated next (Chen et al., 2012).
• Complete device description upload. After the standard SIP registration, the device sends a
MESSAGE request to a media registration server, with XML content carrying all required
information. It can be compared to a second registration against that of a service provider.
• Request / Response for list of registered UA. A UA may query the media registration server
for a list of available, previously registered, devices. Further messaging can be requested
out of the resulting list to mine further information on any device. All subsequent requests
use the OPTIONS / MESSAGE combination.
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• Multimedia streaming notiﬁcation. A MESSAGE is used to notify on a media stream. The
header description would denote that a streaming session is in progress.
The key concept of this SIP extension proposal is the possibility of having a bank of registered
devices with different media capabilities to choose from. Usually a single SIP implementation
allows for a closed set of available media properties. This SIP extension allows an UAC to
select any UAS based on its published capabilities without needing to query it (Chen et al.,
2012).
Chapters 2 introduced SIP and its extensibility. Chapter 3 presents the evaluation methodology
proposed for the SIPBIO extension.
CHAPTER 3
REQUIREMENTS AND USE CASES
In this chapter the basis of the SIPBIO proposal is presented. A detailed description of a
biometric interaction is followed by a list of the use case scenarios covered by the proposal.
This is followed by a compilation of SIPBIO requirements and then its explanation in the
context of the SIP protocol stack.
3.1 Canonical biometric process
The industry has not deﬁned a standard biometric process. However, general algorithms for
the most basic functions of enrolment and authentication are broadly accepted. This section
introduces these algorithms in their most common form. The main parties in a biometric inter-
action are known as the biometric client and the biometric server. They are referred to here as
the bio-client and bio-server.
Enrolment. Before a user can be authenticated, they have to be registered through an enrol-
ment process. The steps followed during this procedure are shown next.
1. The bio-client requests a user’s status from the bio-server who replies with a negative
result. This step is not part of the enrolment process but is included for clarity.
2. The bio-client sends a payload collection event to the bio-server that replies with the
result of the collection.
3. If the result of the collection is successful, the biometric print is created and the
registration process is completed.
Veriﬁcation. A registered user can be veriﬁed through the analysis of a fresh biometric pay-
load. The results are to be compared against the one on record.
1. The bio-client requests a user status from the UAS. The bio-server replies with a
positive result.
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2. The bio-client sends a payload collection event to the bio-server that replies with the
result of the collection.
3. If the result of the collection is successful, the biometric veriﬁcation is completed,
and the bio-server sends the result back to the bio-client.
These general biometric algorithms are not complex. For biometric implementations, the dif-
ﬁculties lie on the challenges associated with the implementation: data collections, payload
quality and security. A biometric implementation should also include intermediate steps to
deal with other outcomes such as uncertain results or unexpected payloads, etc. Figure 3.1
shows a schema of the general process. Figure 3.2 shows the corresponding sequence diagram.
Figure 3.1 Biometric process ﬂow
At this point no relationship is intended between the biometric algorithms and the SIP. The
terms bio-client and bio-server are used only to establish a parallel between them and the
corresponding UAC and UAS entities. Even if repetitive, it is important to clarify the role of
each entity in the biometric exchange.
bio-client: UAC. This is the client application. It features either a biometric payload reader or
close relationship with a separate device holding one. Depending on the implementation,
it can be a light application to interface customer data, send requests and display retrieved
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Figure 3.2 Biometric process sequence diagram
results; or it can be a full application server where biometric interfacing is only one of
its functions.
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bio-server: UAS. This is the application server. It receives biometric requests that it needs to
properly route to a biometric engine. It needs to be "intelligent" enough to build requests
based on requested information, complemented with data gathered from other sources
(e.g. a database).
Database (DB). This is the entity that holds bioprints. Most implementations use it to hold
conﬁguration and application states.
Biometric Engine. This is the element that performs biometric analysis. It should be able
to receive a digital representation of a biometric payload, analyse it and return either a
bioprint or a score.
The sequence shown in Figure 3.2 includes not only the communication between the client and
server entities but also depicts active process components: the database and biometric engine
from an event and response perspective. This sequence allows the expansion of the simpliﬁed
enrolment and veriﬁcation processes into a full implementable algorithm. Once again, no
direct SIP representation is intended at this point. Communication between the actors can be
completed through any available channel like a TCP socket or an HTTP.
1. The bio-client sends a request to a bio-server to inquire about the status of a user identiﬁed
with a certain user ID: the claimed ID. Note that the bio-client itself should not get this
information directly from the database. This job should be left to the bio-server.
2. Since the bio-server does not hold user information it queries the database for the status of
the ID.
3. The database replies to the bio-server with the user status.
4. The bio-server receives the status and informs the bio-client accordingly.
5. If the ID is already associated with a bioprint:
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a. the bio-client sends a verify identity request for the claimed ID along with the payload
to be analysed. It depends on the biometric application what the payload actually is. It
could be a reference ﬁle (usually in XML format), or the actual digital representation
of the payload.
b. the bio-server retrieves from the database the bioprint associated with the claimed ID.
c. the bio-server builds a verify request for the biometric engine to process. The request
is built in the format expected by the biometric engine (HTTP API, SIP, TCP socket,
etc.). The request ought to contain the claimed ID along with its correspondent bio-
print, and the digital representation of the payload to be analysed. This particular
process is only one of the possible implementation alternatives.
d. the biometric engine sends the results to the bio-server.
e. the bio-server forwards the results to the bio-client. The bio-client, the bio-server,
or both should implement the logic to process different outcomes. Most biometric
engines provide a certitude rate to support the implementation.
6. If the ID is not associated with a bioprint:
a. the bio-client sends an enrol request to the bio-server for the claimed ID along with
its associate payload.
b. the bio-client asks the biometric engine to analyse the biometric payload. The analy-
sis often includes assessment of not biometric features: size, quality, format, etc. The
biometric engine sends the result back to the bio-server.
c. If the biometric payload complies with all required characteristics:
i. the bio-server requests a bioprint creation to the biometric engine. The bioprint
is a binary representation of the biometric characteristics in the payload.
ii. the biometric engine sends the bioprint to the bio-server.
iii. the bio-server registers the bioprint on the database. A user ID may have more
than one associated bioprint.
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iv. ﬁnally, the bio-server reports a successful enrolment to the bio-client. An en-
rolment is considered successful when the user registration is completed, and
its biometric print is saved in the database.
d. If the result of the biometric analysis is not successful, the bio-server sends an en-
rolment error to the bio-client who should have the necessary logic to handle the
situation.
3.2 Use case scenarios
The process shown in Figure 3.2 is the general representation of a biometric event. This section
shows cases as seen in informatics security.
Biometric solutions are classiﬁed into three types: active, passive and off-line.
• Active. It refers those cases where the user intending to access a service actively inter-
acts with the system collecting the biometric payload. Some classic examples of active
biometric systems are:
• A ﬁnger print reader.
• A person interacting with an IVR in a call centre.
• An iris scanner.
In all these cases user are aware of providing their information to a system.
• Passive. It refers to cases where biometric systems collect information without the user
actively participating in the action. Users may or may not be aware of the biometric payload
being collected but they do not need to change their behaviour or execute a particular action
to provide the information. Typical cases of passive biometric systems are:
• Security cameras in a public space.
• A call recording system.
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• A behavioural typing system.
• Off-line. Off-line analysis is the exercise of analysing biometric payloads that have been
previously collected. It is mainly used for fraud detection and identiﬁcation purposes.
For instance, when a biometric payload is required to be compared against a collection of
existing identiﬁed payloads to ﬁnd a match. This use case is frequently found in the work
of public safety investigation agencies.
Some key differences between the biometric types are:
• the way the biometric payload is collected. In active systems the biometric payload is
directly sent from a provider device to the biometric component able to process it. Passive
and off-line biometrics require an architectural design able to collect the payload from
third-party systems.
• the way the biometric payload is sent to the biometric analysis server. Active systems
gather the payload and send it along with the biometric processing request to the biometric
analysis engine or its front end. Passive systems usually provide indications of where the
payload is located and how it is going to be provided. In other words, additional compo-
nents are required to access, classify and provision the payload for the biometric engine to
analyse.
• the way the user identiﬁcation is included in the process. In active and off-line systems, the
claimed ID is collected from a third party system automatically as part of the interaction
process. In passive systems, there is usually a trusted party (a person / customer represen-
tative) required to guarantee the claimed ID matches the claimed identity. For instance, if
the claimed ID belongs to a woman but the person making the claim is a man, there would
be a contradiction that the trusted party should be able to identify (Reid, 2003b; Martin,
2013).
The next following subsections describe some common scenarios of biometric interactions to
illustrate use case scenarios in detail.
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3.2.1 Scenario 1: One-time Active Voice Biometrics authentication (OTAVB)
Active Voice Biometrics is the process of a speaker (user) consciously interacting with a system
that guides them through a set of stages to complete a given process. For instance, a user calls
a support centre, his call is answered by an IVR system that proceeds to direct them through
a series of prompts to achieve authentication. Providing the user has already enrolled with the
system, they are asked to repeat a passphrase. The collected spoken audio is processed and the
biometric result is compared against a stored voiceprint. Since the biometric process is of a
statistical nature, the result is never expected to be 100% match with the original voiceprint. It
is up to the company using the biometric system to deﬁne which False Acceptance (FA) and
False Reject (FR) rates are acceptable. If the veriﬁcation result of the operation falls within the
accepted margins the authentication is considered successful (Jain et al., 2006).
An important aspect of the active authentication process is the passphrase the user is expected
to repeat with the same biometric properties that the passphrase used during the enrolment
process. In some instances, the user may be asked to repeat some random but predetermined
phrases to rule out the possibility of a playback attack. Active biometrics is also characterised
by the user being fully aware of the procedure and actively participating in the steps to com-
plete the biometric process. For instance, a digital ﬁnger print requires the active participation
of the user. The user needs to purposefully place a ﬁnger or thumb onto a ﬁngerprint reader. In
this active process the user is guided through the steps. In the speciﬁc case of voice biometrics,
an IVR guides the customer to repeat a passphrase leading to either their enrolment or authen-
tication. Usually, in active biometrics, the gathering of the biometric payload is simple: the
user is requested to provide it through a speciﬁc technical mechanism that collects and sends it
to the bio-server in the required format for its analysis (Sui et al., 2012).
The authentication process is executed at the beginning of the voice interaction and the result
will determine if the user is given direct access to the offered service or if a further authenti-
cation stage is needed (e.g. forward the call to a customer advisor for further authentication).
Figure 3.3 shows a veriﬁcation process and its corresponding enrolment steps. Note that the
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sequence is based in the case of voice biometrics where an IVR directs biometric requests to
the biometric system.
Figure 3.3 Classic enrolment / veriﬁcation sequence - active biometrics.
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3.2.2 Scenario 2: One-time Passive Voice Biometrics authentication (OTPVB)
Passive Voice Biometrics is the process of analysing the voice of a speaker without direct user
interaction with the biometric system. The user payload is collected and analysed in the back-
ground whilst the user interacts freely with another person (e.g. a customer calling a call centre
would have his voice captured for voice biometrics analysis). Contrary to the active biometrics
process, the user is not expected to follow a speciﬁc matching key sequence (like a passphrase
in a voice biometrics scenario). The system instead analyses the biometric characteristics of
the provided payload while the user participates in a regular interaction. The associated en-
rolment process for passive biometrics requires more data in the payload to complete. During
the authentication process, the payload collected is evaluated and compared with the stored
bioprint (Desai, 2016).
The rest of the process is similar to the active biometrics previously described: if the biometric
results are considered successful per the predetermined FA / FR rates, the user is given access
to the service, otherwise the user is guided to another system for further authentication. For the
speciﬁc case of passive voice biometrics, an abstraction of the ﬂow is shown in Figure 3.4. As
with all other mentioned biometric processes, each implementation may introduce variations
to that ﬂow.
3.2.3 Scenario 3: Discrete Intervals Passive Voice Biometrics authentication (DIPVB)
The DIPVB process differs from OTPVB in one way: the authentication is repeated at discrete
intervals to guarantee that the same person is using the system through the entire length of the
interaction. OTPVB can be thought of as a special case of DIPVB where the number of discrete
intervals is one. This method is seldom used since it requires more system resources and it is
usually safe to assume that, at least for the case of voice biometrics, a customer advisor should
be able to recognize if there is a sudden change of customer voice on the line. This method
is used in high security environments or when the user is not interacting with a trusted party
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Figure 3.4 Classic enrolment / veriﬁcation sequence - passive biometrics.
so is unable to conﬁrm that the identiﬁed individual remains the same during the interaction
(Saevanee et al., 2015).
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3.3 Simpliﬁed biometric distribution
Until now all components have been described in real-time systems that use a biometric in-
teraction. This section simpliﬁes the description to make it approachable from a SIP design
perspective. It has been mentioned that SIPBIO aims at standardising the interactions between
components in a biometric interaction. Although any component can be upgraded to support
SIPBIO, some systems have established communication protocols. It is the work of the SIP-
BIO designer to blend seamlessly into any environment. The sequence shown in Figure 3.1 can
be condensed into the one shown in Figure 3.5 where only two entities the UAC (bio-client)
and UAS (bio-server) are pictured. All intermediate interactions are integrated in the SIP side
of the design.
A condensed representation allows a simpliﬁcation of the model. The sequence in Figure
3.5 shows how some of the interactions are abstracted behind the concept of the bio-server
previously deﬁned, but which takes a lead character in a condensed ﬂow. An implementation
must allow for the internal tasks required to complete bio-client requests. This could be a
biometric engine that exposes a set of HTTP-based APIs. In such case, a segment of the focus
interaction may appear as the ﬂow extract shown in Figure 3.6. Note that bio-client to bio-
server communication is using SIP, as proposed by SIPBIO, while requests to the biometric
engine use HTTP. This is one of multiple options.
The concept of biometric engine interaction and SIPBIO endpoint separation is key to avoid
confusing the responsibilities and tasks assigned to each of them. SIPBIO endpoints are used
is to request biometric operations or respond with the results of such operations. However,
SIPBIO endpoints do not process the biometric payload, their role is messaging, not the bio-
metric analysis itself. The endpoint holding a SIPBIO endpoint must also have a component
that interacts with the biometric engine. Those two operations are to be kept separate to avoid
one depending on the other. Biometric engines evolve themselves but the basic operations of
analysing a payload and provide biometric results is universal and will not be altered. The
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Figure 3.5 Biometric ﬂow
condensed.
designer must make sure there is communication between the two sides (components) while
providing them process independence.
This abstraction subsequently allows for a clear transition in the naming conventions to UAC
to UAS as shown in Figure 3.7.
In any case, it is key to remember that UAC and UAS are naming conventions to represent two
actors conversing by SIP, one being the initiator and the other the responder.
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Figure 3.6 Biometric ﬂow with associated
HTTP APIs.
Figure 3.7 Naming equivalence for biometric actors.
3.4 Extended distribution
Section 3.3 is an exercise to understand the concept of entities assuming a SIP enabled role in
the communication establishment process. This section intends to extend the concepts to real
life scenarios in order to better acknowledge the upcoming SIPBIO protocol requirements.
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Figure 3.8 depicts how a SIPBIO can be introduced to a customer self-service system in a
call centre or mobile authentication environment. Note that the inter-network separation ele-
ment can either be telephony or network oriented: an Internet router, a ﬁrewall, an SBC, etc.
The authentication payload element can either be a voice, face, digital print, etc. In general,
any payload for which a capturing device and a digitalization method exist can be accurately
represented by Figure 3.8 schema. Although every chosen interaction between two different
elements can be set up through SIP, interactions are represented under the most commonly used
protocol to date as per thread type (e.g. HTTP, SIP, etc.). Note how the self-service system
is the coordinator of transactions between different components with the bio-client application
server being the active element facilitating interactions. This model would allow the intro-
duction of a universal session identiﬁer for all SIP-based communications as proposed in RFC
7329 (Kaplan, 2014). The ﬁrst active element receiving a SIP interaction would introduce a
universal SIP identiﬁer that would be consequently handled by all other elements in the path.
The bio-client should be able to understand and keep the identiﬁer with the SIPBIO session
and all other coordinated SIP sessions. Every element would be part of the same interaction.
Figure 3.8 Extended distribution active biometrics example.
This section does not intend to repeat the ﬂow diagrams already presented. However, to make
it clear the interactions in 3.8 are itemized next:
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1. A user initiates a contact to a service provider. If a voice contact, the communication is
initiated through PSTN SIP trunks. If not a voice contact, the communication is likely to
be HTTP. Should the client be RFC 7329 compliant, it should include a universal SIP ID.
2. Depending on the nature of the incoming request, the border element (Internet router or
SBC) forwards the request to a self-service system via SIP or HTTP. If this active element
is RFC 7329 compliant, it would either handle a received universal SIP ID or insert one
into the path if relevant.
3. The self-service system includes the bio-client application server and may also include
an IVR. Communication between the elements in the self-service system is accomplished
through SIP or HTTP. If none of the previous active elements has introduced a universal
SIP ID, the bio-client should add it to the communication path.
4. The bio-client orchestrates the user interaction. For instance, it establishes a SIPBIO ses-
sion to a biometric system. It can also coordinate the delivery of payload to the appropriate
capture device. Depending on the payload type, the source of data, as well as its transport
method, may vary.
5. Being the front-end of the biometric system, the bio-server receives requests and coor-
dinates appropriate responses or actions with other internal components (e.g. databases,
biometric engines, etc.) Internal communication is currently usually done through TCP
sockets; however, nothing impedes the development of SIP/SIPBIO interfaces when com-
mercially viable.
Another case of an extended distribution would be a passive biometric system in a call centre
environment. If a customer enquiry could not have been resolved at the IVR level, the call
would be transferred to a customer representative. A simpliﬁcation of such a system is shown
in Figure 3.9. It must be noted that there is not a universal conﬁguration for a call centre. A
viable alternative is presented based on the most commonly used technology, communication
protocols and the proposed SIPBIO alternative.
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Figure 3.9 Extended distribution passive biometrics example.
While many steps are involved in completing a call centre request, the following is a highlight
of those interactions of interest for the purposes of this proposal.
1. A user initiates a contact to a service provider. The communication is likely to be initiated
through PSTN SIP trunks or through a SIP phone over the Internet. Should the client be
RFC 7329 compliant, it should include a universal SIP ID.
2. If the self-service system was not able to fulﬁl the user’s request, the call is forwarded
to a queue where an agent with the appropriate skills eventually receives it. Notably two
events are relevant: if the agent phone is SIP, a SIP communication establishment would
be completed between the telephony system and the agent extension; and, a CTI event is
generated from the telephony system to the bio-client application server. A universal SIP
ID can be passed (or introduced) in both interactions. Note that most CTI protocols are
vendor proprietary. It does not mean CTI could not be passed through an SIP-like protocol,
it is just not available in the market.
3. The bio-client orchestrates the agent interaction with the biometric system. For instance,
it establishes an SIPBIO session to a biometric solution. It can provide the agent with
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visualisation highlights through the enrolment or veriﬁcation process. If required, it can
also coordinate the delivery of payload to the appropriate capture device.
The descriptions of several real-time scenarios have been introduced to display some of the
possibilities SIPBIO opens for easing biometric authentication across elements in a communi-
cation chain. The next section shows the standard requirements of the protocol to facilitate its
design in the upcoming chapter.
3.5 Requirements
This section provides a description of the requirements of a SIP extension to handle biometric
authentication. Requirements are developed based on the use case scenarios described in the
previous section.
Association of biometric information with multimedia session description. The UA receiv-
ing the biometric information should be able to associate it with the corresponding mul-
timedia information (audio containing the voice in the case of voice biometrics). Usually
this information is transmitted in the body of SIP messages as SDP content. The biomet-
ric information should be inside the SDP characteristics.
Support Active or Passive Biometrics. Both, UAC and UAS should be able to select and
handle both types of authentication. If one of the biometric types is not available, the
protocol should be able to readily switch to the supported type or cancel the request.
Support frequency of authentication. In any authentication type, it should be possible to de-
ﬁne whether it will be executed only once or at different intervals during the duration of
the interaction.
Support exchange of metadata of information with third party systems. To search for matches
between biometric identiﬁcation and identiﬁcation, UAs need to receive a claimed ID
from a back-end system. Receiving information, to use it in the matching process of the
biometric print, must be supported.
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Avoiding additional connections. The authentication process should be completed within one
single connection.
Format negotiation. Every environment susceptible of being biometric enabled handles me-
dia in different media formats. For instance, in telephony environments every VoIP so-
lution uses one or more compression codecs: G.711, G.729, G.723, etc. Support for
different media formats should be allowed.
Progress information. The ability to report partial progress of the biometric analysis should
be supported.
3.6 Extending SIP
As discussed above, when extending the base SIP protocol, guidelines exposed in RFC4485
need to be followed. A recapitulation of those guidelines with focus on the key design topic
suggested by them is useful before proceeding to the proposal presentation.
Criterion 1: SIP Solution Space. This proposal leverages the capabilities of SIP to initiate,
modify, and terminate interactive sessions. Sessions are to be established with the pur-
pose of performing a biometric operation. For this purpose, SIP will work in combination
with SDP for the deﬁnition of the media characteristics of biometric payloads. The path
of the media exchange is completely independent of the path followed by SIP session
messages. Communication parties (UAs) are to be aware of the biometric nature of the
sessions they will be establishing.
Criterion 2: SIP Architecture Model. SIP architecture is a vast topic, those of interest for
the purpose of this proposal are outlined next.
1. SIP independence. The nature of the media content exchange between the biometric
aware parties is independent of the SIP session itself. Any type of biometric payload
can be exchanged through the SIP session.
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2. SIP and Session path independence. SIP messages traverse an independent path of
the one traversed by the media content of the correspondent sessions.
3. Multi-provider and multi-hop. It is assumed that the parties in the biometric ex-
change are in different networks separated by n hops where n> 1 up to the maximum
number speciﬁed by the base SIP protocol (max− f orward = 70 by default).
4. Transactional. All proposed SIP message exchanges are deﬁned under the assump-
tion of a request / response model.
5. Proxies can ignore bodies. None of the proposed SIP extensions to the body (pay-
load) inﬂuence the routing policies.
6. Proxies do not need to understand the method. No new methods are deﬁned in this
proposal.
7. INVITE message carries full state. Any SIP INVITE or subsequent Re-INVITE carry
all signaling information to proceed with the transaction. There is no need to collect
information from several INVITEs to process a single response.
8. Generality over efﬁciency. SIPBIO is designed to handle any payload and treat bio-
metric processes in a general way. For illustration purposes the functionality is ex-
plained as a function of voice biometrics.
9. The Request URI is the primary key for forwarding. The Request URI indicates a
resource that resolves to the desired recipient. The semantics of the Request URI is
not modiﬁed.
10. Heterogeneity as a norm. Any device able to provide the required information for
the protocol functioning should be able to make use of the extension. There is no
focus on a speciﬁc type of device.
Criterion 3: attention to a set of known SIP issues. There are known issues that have been
previously identiﬁed as being caused by badly deﬁned extensions. The extension pro-
posal must guarantee that these known situations are properly handled.
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1. Backward compatibility. Since the purpose of SIPBIO is to provide a protocol to
handle biometric transactions over SIP, it is necessary that the participant UAs cor-
rectly understand all operations. At the very minimum, a UAS should be able to re-
port unavailability of the service. If the biometric processing service is unavailable,
the transaction must end, and the UAC must be properly informed of the situation.
If a UAS does not understand the extension components the request fails, and the
service cannot be provided; however, an appropriate reply must be sent to the UAC
to allow it to provide a clean treatment of the request (e.g. instruct the application
to handle the authentication in a different way). Due to the nature of SIPBIO se-
curity service unavailability must be cleanly handled. To avoid proxy failures, the
Proxy-Required ﬁeld is never used.
2. Security. SIPBIO does not require any new security speciﬁcation. All default SIP
security mechanisms are deemed sufﬁcient. Owing to the security nature of the
information it is strongly suggested that the signaling and the media sessions are
established through a secure channel. However, it is not a requirement for SIPBIO
to work.
3. Terminology. All the terminology used in this proposal follows the guidelines de-
ﬁned in RFC 2119 and BCP 14.
4. Syntactic. All formal naming used in this proposal follows the recommendations of
RFC 4485.
5. Semantics. This proposal follows the recommendations of RF4485 for semantics.
6. Examples section. To better understand the proposal, an exampled section with most
commonly used cases is included. Examples follow the format and presentation
recommended in RFC 3665 and BCP 75.
7. Other general recommendations. Other recommendations are also considered: overview
section, IANA considerations, document naming conventions and additional consid-
erations for each extended entity.
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3.7 Protocol compliance
A communication protocol is an agreement between two or more entities (peers) on how to
proceed with a communication. The protocol deﬁnes details such as syntax, semantics and
error handling (Tanenbaum and Wetherall, 2011b). An implementation does not necessarily
need to comply with the protocol. For instance, Adamczyk et al. (2008) found that only a few
websites implement the standard HTTP protocol completely.
The implication of developing a non compliance implementation of the protocol is that the
interoperability of the system uses the protocol is handicapped. If another system requires
integrating with an non-compliant entity, it would require custom development which is one of
the situations that SIPBIO is trying to avoid.
Sometimes a vendor ﬁnds that their use cases require to go beyond the protocol standard or
they do not have the resources to fully implement all the protocol requirements. In those
cases, the vendor must report the situation and, if possible, provide instructions on how to
achieve protocol compliance. An example of this case is the base SIP implementation of Cisco
Systems1. They provide instructions on how to achieve RFC compliance of their protocol
implementation which is not 100% compliant by default (Cisco, 2018).
SIPBIO cannot enforce implementation compliance. SIPBIO proposal aims at being clear,




SIPBIO, EXTENDING SIP AND SDP TO SUPPORT BIOMETRIC
AUTHENTICATION
The purpose of this chapter is to describe SIPBIO, the extension to the base protocol, and
working scenarios. The goal of SIPBIO is to provide a signaling mechanism to support a
biometric process. SIPBIO is designed to comply with the requirements deﬁned in the previous
chapter. Different biometric scenarios and their processes have been described in Chapter
3. This chapter now focuses on the extended content of SIP messages used in the protocol
exchange.
Even though this chapter does not explore in detail all possible use case scenarios, the theo-
retical layout can be applied to any biometric interaction. It is up to the developer or software
architect to deﬁne the cases covered by an application.
4.1 SIP option-tags
SIPBIO makes use of the ﬂexibility of the SIP protocol to include information required during
the session as part of the protocol header. SIP headers Required, Supported and Accepted
indicate those features that are, respectively, mandatory, supported or accepted by the UA.
SIPBIO deﬁnes a set of option tags to be used as described next.
bioanalysis. This tag indicates that a UA must support the biometric information exchange as
proposed by SIPBIO. It is set as mandatory by using it in the Required header. To avoid
further processing and to allow the UAC to implement the required logic to handle the
situation. If the feature is not supported, the UAS returns a 420 Bad Extension response.
If the UAC does not implement this tag, the UAS should respond with a 421 Extension
Required message. The UAC can either retry the request by adding the tag in the Re-
quired or Supported headers, or by sending the request to a different UAS that might
accept it with the original format.
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multibiopayload. The use of this tag is optional. It is used in the Supported header. It is
used to indicate that the UAC supports more than one biometric method. This is useful
to perform multi-factor authentication. For instance, a ﬁrst factor could be based on
the voice and the second on the iris recognition. By including this tag, the UAC also
indicates that it supports requests for several biometric payloads for the same session.
Since only one payload type is supported per biometric transaction, several biometric
payloads are supported in a serial fashion.
multibiotype. The use of this tag is also optional. It is used in the Supported header. This tag
is used to indicate that the UAC supports different biometric types. For instance, it may
support active biometrics, passive biometrics or ofﬂine analysis.
application/sipbio. This tag is used to indicate the acceptable Internet media type in the mes-
sage body. In this case, the type is application and the sub-type is sipbio. This tag is used
in the Accept header. In particular this tag indicates that the UAC supports exchange of
information of the speciﬁed sipbio content.
4.2 SIPBIO application content
The application/sipbio tag deﬁnes a new content type for the body of a SIPBIO message. It
is used to deﬁne the characteristics of a biometric session negotiated by the enabled UAC and
UAS pairs. Its deﬁnitions are based on an XML structure deﬁned as SIPBIOInformation.
The elements of the SIPBIOInformation XML structure are deﬁned to support real time trans-
actions as well as to serve as a medium of information exchange by biometric peers. For real
time transactions, the element has to be referenced in the media description of the SIP exchange
that is usually handled by making use of the SDP protocol. Otherwise the XML structure can
be directly transmitted as the body of the exchanged SIP messages. The top-level members of
SIPBIOInformation are described next. All elements of the XML entity are optional depending
on the information exchange. It is up to the implementation developer to choose the right ones
to cover the intended purpose.
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• biotype. It deﬁnes the type of biometric interaction in terms of it being active, passive or
off-line. No constraint on the categories is deﬁned. It is suggested, however, to implement
based on those industry recognized categories.
• vendor. It can be used to describe the speciﬁc technology developer. At the time this
proposal was written, no standard has been adopted for biometric solutions. This XML
structure can be used by developers implementing a particular solution to process based on
logic required for each vendor offering.
• biopayload. It is used to deﬁne the type of payload for the biometric operation. For in-
stance, it can be a voice, a ﬁnger-reading, an iris sample, etc.
• claimedIdentity. This XML high level structure serves as a placeholder for details about the
claimed identity. It can be expanded based on the implementation requirements. It can in-
clude lower level XML declarations referring to customer ID, names, national identiﬁcation
numbers, etc.
• groupInfo. It represents an array of groups the claimed identity should belong to. It can be
used to speed up a biometric identiﬁcation process.
• payloadformat. It is used to deﬁne the format of the biometric payload. Lower levels can
deﬁne technical characteristics such as resolution, ﬁle type, sampling, codecs, etc.
• payloadSource. It deﬁnes the payload source. Possible payload sources include, but are not
limited to: an URI pointing at the location of a ﬁle, network parameters (IP/port, socket) of
a payload source (for instance a media gateway or an IP phone for voice biometrics).
• biometricResults. This high-level structure is used to provide details of the result of a
biometric transaction.
• metadata. It is used for adding metadata to the transaction. In production environments,
this metadata is sometimes called business data.
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• validity. Biometric authentications can have a validity period to avoid impostors taking
over an operation after the initial veriﬁcations. If not speciﬁcally set, the validity of the
operation is assumed to be valid for the entire length of the transaction.
• extraInformation. It can be used to include information not covered by any other XML
label.
Note that further ahead in the description of the message exchange the SIPBIOInformation
XML structure is used extensively under different names just to represent the intention of the
exchange. To avoid confusion, a description follows of the naming convention used in SIPBIO
to designate a particular version of the structure.
• sipbioInfo. It represents an offer with a set of options related or required for a biometric
exchange to be completed. Typically, when it comes from the UA starting the conversation
(the UAC), it represents the set of options supported and offered. When the receiving UA
(the UAS) sends a sipbioinfo, it represents the set options that are being accepted to ﬁnalize
the channel establishment and start the media exchange.
• sipbioInfoRequest. It is the representation of a set of options requested and supported by
a biometric system to complete at least one biometric operation. The messenger of these
options is an UAC.
• sipbioResults. It is the set of results given by a biometric operation. It is sent by the UAS
which, in turn, needs to get them from the biometric engine.
• siobioStatus. It is a partial result of a biometric operation. Once the status reaches 100%,
it is replaced by sipbioResults.
4.3 Extending SDP
SDP is the default protocol of choice for SIP transactions to specify the characteristics of the
multimedia content to be used during a session. Default SDP content includes media informa-
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tion independent of the transaction. Due to the security purpose of biometric transactions, it
is important to establish a direct association between the biometric information and the multi-
media content to guarantee the accuracy of the results. Biometric information can be included
as part of the multimedia content. By doing this association, a direct relationship between the
payload provided during a biometric transaction can be associated with the signaling in the SIP
exchange. Note that isolation between the two elements may be desirable precisely in order to
obfuscate their relation.
When a single biometric transaction is executed as part of, or previous to, an intended informa-
tion exchange, the SDP to SIP association should be completed at the stream level. Stream pro-
cessing should be concurrent for multiple authentication methods (e.g. voice and ﬁnger print
reader being performed at the same time.) By allowing stream level ﬂexibility, two streams on
the same biometric transactions can transport media in different formats. The SIPBIO proposal
deﬁnes an SDP attribute called biometric-info. In general, the attribute looks like:
a= biometric− in f o : codec : schema : SIPBIOIn f ormation (4.1)
or
a= biometric− in f o : codec : uri : SIPBIOIn f ormation (4.2)
As per RFC4566, an attribute a is the recommended way to extend SDP. SIPBIO makes use of
value attributes to be able to convey all required information in one single attribute (Handley
et al., 2006). The following is the breakdown and purpose of each element in the attribute
deﬁnition.
• a. It indicates an attribute in the SDP deﬁnition in the form of a=<attibute> or
a=<attribute>:<value>.
• biometric-info. It is the name of the attribute. SIPBIO introduces an attribute to represent
media features are required for a biometric process.
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• codec. It references the codec to be used for the biometric analysis. The codec should be
taken from one of the m attributes deﬁned. For instance, in a media exchange including
audio, video and text, the audio channel can be selected for the biometric operation.
• schema / uri. This tag references whether the biometric information is sent along with
the message itself (in which case it is tagged as schema) or it is contained in an external
document reachable through a URL (tagged as uri).
• SIPBIOInformation It is an XML element with information required for the biometric anal-
ysis as described in Section 4.2.
4.4 SIPBIO process
SIPBIO expands the content of a default SIP request to establish the dialogues already de-
scribed. This section shows the expanded content of each type of SIP request. For simplicity,
only the elements required to understand each message are shown.
4.4.1 Pre-session establishment
A proper session can be preceded by an optional OPTIONS SIP message. It can be used before
establishing the biometric dialogue. A SIP OPTIONS message is used by the UAC to request
from the UAS a list of supported capabilities. A SIPBIO UAC is expected to establish a dia-
logue with the purpose of a biometric exchange. Thereafter, the UAC needs to determine the
biometric processing characteristics of the UAS. This message is optional. In a non-dynamic
environment, it is possible to deﬁne SIP dialogues starting directly with an INVITE as is ex-
plained later. The use of OPTIONS is suggested to properly construct the INVITE based on
the available UAS features.
Minimally, the OPTIONS message Accept header must have the option tag application/sipbio
as shown in listing 4.1. An Accept header indicates which media types are accepted in the
dialogue.
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Listing 4.1: SIP OPTIONS, no body content






Optionally, a UAC can send all the biometric options supported in the body. A sipbioOptions
structure of content type application/sipbio can be used. In that case the OPTIONS message
would look similar to what is shown in listing 4.2. An XML sample for this case is shown in
listing 4.3.







<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" ?>
<sipbio xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:sipbio">
[...]
Listing 4.3: XML sample for SIP OPTIONS



















A SIP OPTIONS message triggers a response from the UAS. Providing there is no error in the
request and the UAS is able to understand it, a 200 OK SIP response is sent back to the UAC.
Otherwise the UAS should respond as helpfully as possible. For instance, a 406 error message
can be sent when the characteristics required cannot be met by the UAS. An acceptable 200
OK response is shown in listing 4.4. Its corresponding XML body content is shown in listing
4.5. As expected, the XML body is a subset of the characteristics requested in the OPTIONS
requests. A UAS must only reply with the options it supports. For this sample, the UAS (and
the biometric system behind) support active and passive voice biometrics analysis. Also, the
UAS is able to process or coordinate payloads referenced through an URI or included in the
media deﬁnition protocol.
Listing 4.4: 200 OK for SIP OPTIONS
Session Initiation Protocol (200)











<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" ?>
<sipbio xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:sipbio">
[...]
Listing 4.5: XML body 200 OK for SIP OPTION

















The ﬁrst SIP options message is useful for the UAS to build a properly formatted SIP INVITE.
An UAC should have the logic to construct an INVITE based upon the guidance received in the
200 OK SIP response to the OPTIONS request. The exact implementation of the protocol may
vary depending on the application. However, in general, a SIBIO INVITE should include the
bioanalysis tag as a Required header (view tag description in Section 4.1). Tags multipayload
and multibiotype can also be included as Supported. All details of the biometric transaction
are to be included as part of the SIPBIOInformation XML structure. If an OPTIONS mes-
sage interchange was previously used, the INVITE should only include what was reported as
accepted by the 200 OK response to the OPTIONS request. A SIPBIO implementation must
support MIME format as per RFC2045. Meeting this requirement allows SIPBIO messages
to include more than one body part. For instance, a SIPBIO INVITE includes an SDP ele-
ment containing an XML payload for the SIPBIOInformation structure. Listing 4.6 displays
the main components of the header and the multi-part body.
Listing 4.6: SIP INVITE





Allow: INVITE, ACK, CANCEL, OPTIONS, BYE, REFER, NOTIFY,









Session Description Protocol Version (v): 0
[...]
Media Description, name and address (m): audio 6000 RTP/AVP 0
Media Attribute (a): rtpmap:0 PCMU/8000






<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" ?>
<sipbio xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:sipbio">
[...]
At this point of the exchange, two different circumstances may happen: the UAS agrees with
the media session parameters received in the INVITE or the UAS responds with an alternative
offer to establish the session. The latter situation would be avoided if an OPTION / 200 OK
exchange were properly completed before the initial INVITE.
The simplest case is the one in which there is an immediate agreement on the sipbio con-
tent type as represented by the SIPBIOInformation structure in either of the alternative body
contents of the INVITE.
The 200 OK message is likely to look as the response shown in listing 4.7. Note that even
though the SIP INVITE supports MIME, that is, multiple bodies may be deﬁned (as shown in
listing 4.6), a 200 OK response must choose one single body type. To keep the information
exchange going, the body part contains an biometricInfo attribute that is formed as deﬁned by
the SIPBIOInformation structure.
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Listing 4.7: 200 OK for SIP INVITE
Session Initiation Protocol (200)






Allow: INVITE, ACK, BYE, CANCEL, OPTIONS, MESSAGE, INFO,






Session Description Protocol Version (v): 0
[...]
Media Description, name and address (m): audio 27942 RTP/AVP 0
Media Attribute (a): rtpmap:0 PCMU/8000
Media Attribute (a): biometric-info:0:schema:SIPBIOInformation
[...]
Should the INVITE not be compliant with the expected format, an UAS should respond with a
405 Method not allowed message.
Another possibility is when the INVITE contains several mutually exclusive biometric options
that are all accepted by the UAS. This case is handled by the UAS sending a 183 (session in
progress) message. This message carries a body content with the biometricInfo attribute. This
message can be considered a biometric information offer. The UAS responds with the subset
of supported biometric parameters to which the UAC must subsequently respond according to
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the offered format. A 183 session in progress attribute indicates that information about the
session state is included in the body of the message. As stated, this quality is used to establish
a dialogue with the UAC with the aim of agreeing on the parameters that allow a biometric
exchange of information. Since 183 is a provisional response, the protocol indicates that a
200 OK PRACK (provisional acknowledge) is due. This 200 OK PRACK message allows
the UAC to report the reception of the previous communication and, at the same time, make
an offer on the set of properties required by the UAS to allow the initiation of the biometric
exchange. As shown previously, this offer is contained in the biometricInfo attribute in the body
of the message. This exchange could potentially follow several interactions of 183 vs 200 OK
PRACK, until the UA runs out of options or as long as the implementation allows. In a system
able to receive multiple biometric payloads this exchange can help to narrow down the available
payloads. For instance, a Website or mobile application could allow biometric authentication
through the on-board camera (face, retina), a ﬁngerprint, voice, typing behaviour, etc.
4.4.3 Three way handshake completion
Only at this point is the UAC is able to fully acknowledge the initial INVITE. As the previous
subsection explained, the UAS is to send a 200 OK message with the accepted parameters to
enable the media session exchange of the biometric payload required for a biometric interac-
tion. At that point the UAC sends an ACK message that marks the ﬁnal response to the INVITE.
To keep consistency, the CSeq number is not increased for the ACK but the CSeq method is
changed to ACK. Since the initial INVITE in the process contained a message body, the ACK
may not contain a message body. However, if the implementation requires a message to be
carried in the body, it may do so by taking advantage of the fact that an ACK to a 200 OK is
end-to-end instead of hop by hop.
4.4.4 Media session and termination
Once the communication is agreed upon, media can be exchanged either between UAC and
UAS or between the corresponding nodes as established by the signaling (as previously de-
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scribed). The media session is the transmission of the biometric payload from the biometric
reader-enabled device (e.g. a phone for voice biometrics) to the biometric payload reader. The
reader is in charge of collecting the payload, applying any required transformation to be ﬁnally
sent to the biometric engine for analysis. A biometric payload reading process, along with
the biometric analysis, is independent of the signaling process facilitating the operation. An
implementation of the protocol must take into account all realms: signal establishment, media
exchange and biometric analysis.
In a simple interaction, once the media exchanged is completed the implementation should
handle the logic to complete the biometric operations and tear down the SIPBIO session. A
BYE is sent by the UAS to the UAC to indicate the ﬁnalization of the SIP session. Note that
under this basic scenario SIPBIO transports the results in the BYE message that triggers the
termination of the dialogue. Even though this is a rather unusual approach, it is not forbidden
by the SIP based protocol. The implementation must ensure not only that it is the UAS that
ﬁnalises the dialogue but also that the UAC is able to read and process sipbioResults. As
mentioned, this approach is not conventional but it is supported as a simple alternative for
implementations that require light and simple code.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the process described in the latest subsections. It expresses the simplest
information exchange in a SIPBIO operation. Out of simplicity, it is assumed that the UAC is
also the biometric payload reader while the UAS is the biometric payload receiver. Figure 4.2
shows a diagram with an alternative approach where these two entities are completely separated
from those that establish the media exchange channel.
4.4.5 Multiple alternative payloads
Subsection 4.4.2 illustrates a UAC generated INVITE including concurrent biometric alterna-
tives. A UAS can negotiate a preferred biometric exchange type or, alternatively, it can reply
with clear information for the UAC to handle the payload for each biometric type. To refresh
the understanding of the former case, UAS replies to an INVITE with a 183 Session in progress
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Figure 4.1 SIPBIO simple session.
Figure 4.2 SIPBIO simple session (off band media).
with the suggested features in its body either as content/sdp or content/sipbio. In both cases,
supported biometric ﬁelds are transmitted in the form of a biometricInfo XML structure. The
implementation must be as speciﬁc as possible unless it is imperative that the UAC choose the
desired format. For instance, if the UAS supports handling of session establishment for voice
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and face biometrics but consent from the user is required for either case, the UAC must im-
plement the logic to let the user decide, instead of the UAS imposing a method. To a 183 SIP
message, a UAC must reply with a 200 OK PRACK, which it can use to provide its biometric
offer.
In theory, this exchange could go on for a number of loops equal to the number of biometric
handling options. In practice, an implementation is likely to favour an option based on a par-
ticular scenario in order to keep SIP message exchange at a minimum. A visual representation
of this process is shown in Figure 4.3. To ease visualisation, all sequences assume the UAC to
be a payload reader for any biometric type and the UAS to be a payload receiver for any type
of media. Note that the ﬁnal loop (sipbioinfo negotiation) does not have a 200 OK PRACK,
instead the UAS simply responds with a 200 OK containing the sipbio info parameters agreed
upon in the loop.
Figure 4.3 SIPBIO multiple choices / one stream.
The treatment of the SIPBIO invite with multipart body assumes a multipart / alternative direc-
tive is being used: each alternative body carries the same information but in different formats.
Since it may be the case that a particular environment is able to handle multiple biometric pay-
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loads, a SIPBIO UAC implementation must be able to set media paths for multiple payloads.
Should a UAS need to provide information to handle this case, it can be done by constructing a
sibioInfo XML response, based on the SIPBIOInformation XML structure, or building a SDP
response body specifying several media channels, one for each payload type.
4.4.6 Multiple concurrent payloads
In Subsection 4.4.5, an UAC offers several alternative descriptions of the same payload type for
the UAS to choose from. A negotiation follows the offer to agree on a speciﬁc set of options to
establish a media session. However, it is very possible that the objective is to transmit multiple
payloads at once, like when two or more biometric operations need to be performed in parallel:
voice, face and ﬁngerprint through a mobile phone. RFC 3388 and 8108 outline recommended
approaches for different scenarios ((Camarillo et al., 2002), (Lennox et al., 2017)). Imple-
menters should reference the speciﬁc RFC for design guidelines. In the context of SIPBIO, the
objective would be to achieve the situation shown in Figure 4.4 where a single SIP negotiation
leads to n different payloads being sent in parallel from one or more payload readers to one
or more payload interpreters or receivers. This behaviour is ideal but potentially complex to
implement under the constraints of current protocol standards so implementers may choose
to either transmit payloads sequentially by modifying SIPBIO sessions characteristics through
RE-INVITES or have separate concurrent SIPBIO sessions, one per payload. Either approach
reduces complexity but introduces delays and a number of required signalling messages.
4.4.7 Status updates
Most biometric operations take a short time to complete, usually between one to three seconds.
However, some of them can take several minutes to complete, as with voice biometrics en-
rolments. An UAC requesting a biometric result is likely to want feedback on the status of a
request to know if it failed or if it is still in process. SIPBIO makes use of the SUBSCRIBE
and SIP NOTIFY methods to allow a UAC to receive updates from an UAS. Each subscription
establishes a new dialogue between the parties.
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Figure 4.4 SIPBIO multiple choices / multiple streams.
So far, biometric results have been sent as the body of the SIPBIO BYE used to terminate the
biometric session dialogue. Although this is a technically viable approach, it is not a common
either which may lead to SIPBIO not being adopted. A more standard approach would be to
add a subscription to biometric events to receive the results of the analysis. A viable call ﬂow
with updates on the result of the analysis is shown in Figure 4.5. In this case, the implementer
decides to subscribe for a long time (the deﬁnition of a long time depends on the application),
once media starts to ﬂow, the UAC is able to send NOTIFY events with updates on the current
states of the biometric analysis. When the analysis ﬁnishes, the UAC sends a re-SUBSCRIBE
on the same session with an expires parameter of zero to effectively terminate the subscription
dialogue. Implementing updates with the SUBSCRIBE / NOTIFY methods provides the sort
of ﬂexibility required to accommodate different types of biometric analysis. The implementer
can choose to subscribe for a short interval and only renew the subscription if required (e.g. the
biometric analysis has not ﬁnalised). Also, the subscription could be terminated by the UAS if
required.
Notably, the last NOTIFY would carry the result, allowing the SIPBIO BYE to act in the
standard way of simply being a termination signal to destroy the communication path and the
SIP dialogue.
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Figure 4.5 SIPBIO with updates.
4.5 Mandatory methods header ﬁelds
Methods serve to request a speciﬁc action to be taken by a UA. Previous sections introduced
the functioning of SIPBIO and some common scenarios. This section is intended as a reference
guide for developers and solution architects planning to use SIPBIO. Due to the nature of the
SIPBIO protocol and its inherited SIP ﬂexibility, every method and response message in SIP-
BIO are customisable to meet implementation requirements. Designers and developers must
take into account that there are mandatory ﬁelds in order to keep the consistency of the protocol
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and to create a logical dialogue. Those ﬁelds are listed next for all relevant methods. Those
unmentioned methods are either not used by SIPBIO or do not have any possible modiﬁcation
compared to SIP. Messages and their purpose are not explained. For an introduction please
refer to Chapter 2 or the referenced literature. Some ﬁelds are shown with values to provide
greater clarity on their role in SIPBIO.
INVITE. As per its role in starting the communication channel, the INVITE must be able to
inform or establish the following: who to contact, who is trying to establish the connec-
tion, how to reach the destination, initiate the SIP sequencing and request the initiation








• Require: bioanalysis; UAS needs to communicate the requirement to the respective
UAS.
BYE. In the context of simpliﬁed sequences, a BYE message has not only the task of closing
down the communication channel, but it is also in charge of sending the results of a
biometric operation to the UAC. For SIPBIO communication establishment, mandatory








• Content-Length > 0; For SIPBIO short form transactions.
ACK. As a method used to acknowledge a ﬁnal response to an INVITE request, the CSeq
ﬁeld is not increased. Even though, in general, when the initial INVITE carries media
information, the corresponding ACK usually does not. SIPBIO leverages this capability







• Content-Type; UAS needs to know what type of content is expected to process SIP-
BIO properties accordingly.
OPTIONS. As a method used to acknowledge a ﬁnal response to an INVITE request, the CSeq
ﬁeld is not increased. Even though, in general, when the initial INVITE carries media
information the corresponding ACK usually does not carry any, SIPBIO leverages this








• Content-Type; UAS needs to know what type of content is expected to process SIP-
BIO properties accordingly.









• Allow-Events: dialog; alternative SIP Event Packages for biometrics could be de-
veloped but that topic is not considered here. For the time being the dialog event
package, as of RFC 4235 is considered to be sufﬁcient as long as content type
application/dialog-info+xml is supported. The use of a SIPBIO SIPBIOInformation
XML structure is consequently compatible.
NOTIFY. This method is used in the context of operations explained in Subsection 4.4.7. It










• Allow-Events: dialog; (see note on SUBSCRIBE message.)
• Subscription-State
PRACK. This method is used in the context of operations explained in Subsection 4.4.7. It








• Content-Type; UAS needs to know what type of content is expected and / or sup-
ported to process SIPBIO responses accordingly.
4.6 SIPBIO limitations
Being a signaling text based encoded protocol, SIPBIO has some known limitations:
• SIPBIO does not have any security mechanism beyond the regular digest authentication
that SIP provides. For a secured implementation, SIPBIO needs to be deployed over a
secured transport protocol.
• When no secured, SIPBIO can be subject to eavesdropping and man in the middle attacks.
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• As of today, there is not an available SIPBIO SDK. Developers need to start from a known
SIP SDK and create their own models for SIPBIO to work properly. It risks implementa-
tions to follow non-compliant patterns for biometric scenarios.
As SIPBIO usage becomes more popular, other issues are likely to arise. A proper version
management system is required to allow protocol improvements to be track and made available
to de the developers community.
4.7 Closing summary
This concludes the presentation of SIPBIO, a SIP-based protocol to establish, maintain and
terminate communication channels that allow parties to exchange biometric information. New
option tags were introduced to serve as ﬂags to guide session establishment. An XML struc-
ture, to transport information required for biometric sessions, was presented. An alternative
mechanism to transmit biometric payload information on an SDP body was explained. The
operation process of session handling was introduced for most common scenarios and, ﬁnally,
a guide for required method headers was lined up.
CHAPTER 5
SIMULATION AND TESTS
SIPBIO is a ﬂexible protocol conceived to be implemented in different situations and environ-
ments to supply solutions to any biometric scenario. This chapter presents the simulation of a
single scenario to prove the feasibility of the protocol to cover the use cases and demonstrate
to clarity of a potential implementation.
5.1 Preparation
This section illustrates the criteria used to deﬁne the strategy to probe the viability of SIPBIO.
It explains the reasons to selecting a simulation versus an implementation of the protocol and
introduces the technology used to complete a relevant representation of a use case.
5.1.1 Selection criteria
A biometric scenario to test has been selected based on the following criteria:
• Representative of the main messages (events) required to complete a biometric operation.
• Simple enough to clearly represent the concepts without needing too many messages to
establish a communication.
Then, taking into account that:
• Active biometrics interactions are simpler than passive ones since they do not have to deal
with the complexity of capturing a payload while it is being produced (active interactions
expect a biometric payload to be provided after it has been collected).
• A veriﬁcation is simpler than an enrolment since given a known claimed ID, the biometric
payload has to be analysed against an expected biometric print rather than performing a
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registration for a new user. However, a veriﬁcation requires all basic biometric operations
to be completed which makes it suitable for the required testing process.
The scenario that has been chosen is the One-time Active Voice Biometrics authentication
(OTAVB) described in Subsection 3.2.1. The sequence shown in Figure 3.7 is used as a refer-
ence for the simulation.
It is important to note that non valid scenarios were also tested. Non valid scenarios in the con-
cept of SIPBIO refers to those in which the protocol is malformed or the message sequencing
does not follow a valid SIP ﬂow (for instance a response to a request never sent.) Non valid
biometric scenarios do not necessarily mean non valid SIPBIO scenarios. Biometrics payloads
and the result of their analysis are independent of the communication between the SIPBIO
endpoints.
5.1.2 Environment
The testing environment has been built to allow two SIPBIO enabled UAs to establish a session
between them and to complete a biometric operation on a local network.
Instead of developing a partial or full implementation of the protocol, it was decided to simulate
a chosen scenario. A simulation provides the advantage of being highly ﬂexible and easy to set
up. By simulating scenarios, the syntaxes and request / response models can be proven before
investing time and resources in an implementation.
A simulation is also useful to detect eventual problems in the protocol design, provide al-
ternatives and, in general, foresee the functioning of a solution that follows the proposal. A
simulation is not run with load test objectives. Load testing would be performed by a future
implementation of the protocol.
While a simulation makes a simpliﬁcation of real scenarios, it provides controlled experimenta-
tion without much overhead. A further step in the testing could be an emulation which mimics
a more realistic behaviour by combining the simulation with a realistic testbed (Fall, 1999).
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For instance, to emulate SIPBIO, SIPBIO endpoints would be required to actually commu-
nicate with biometric engines and provide real results. In the chosen simulations, biometric
results are assumed.
To accomplish the simulation and its posterior visualization and analysis, the following tools
are used:
SIPp, SIP simulation engine. SIPp1, is an open source test tool / trafﬁc generator for the SIP
protocol (Gayraud and Jacques, 2014). SIPp is commonly used in academic works to test
functionality and performance. Some recent examples of SIPp utilization to simulate SIP
proposals are the works by Stanek and Kencl (2011); Dassouki et al. (2014); Ryu et al.
(2012).
SIPp allows the testing of the SIPBIO messaging exchange without requiring the pro-
gramming of a whole SIP endpoint from scratch, with the added complexity that it im-
plies.
Trafﬁc capturing. Network trafﬁc is captured on the servers with TCPDump2 4.9.0. TCP-
Dump constitutes a simple yet powerful tool to listen to newtwork trafﬁc at any commu-
nication point. A good introduction to the use of TCPDump has been written by Datt
(2016). TCPDump is a common tool in computer networks research: for instance, Mid-
dleton and Modafferi (2016) use it to determine trafﬁc levels on which to apply a QoS
classiﬁcation.
Tafﬁc analysis and visualization. Wireshark3 2.4.2. is used to read, verify, and analyse the
captured trafﬁc. Wireshark is a popular tool among network engineers and computer
scientists. Ample literature is available for the use of Wireshark, a recent good reference





Examples directly related to SIP trafﬁc analysis can be found in Devlic (2010) and Aim-
ilia et al. (2016).
5.1.3 Test environment layout
Figure 5.1 illustrates the simplicity of the test environment. To keep things simple all tests are
run on two virtual machines connected to the same network segment. Table 5.1 shows relevant
information for the test servers.
Figure 5.1 Test layout.
Table 5.1 Unique server properties.
Property / Server Server 01 Server 02
General role UAC UAS
Biometric role bio-client bio-server
IP address 10.3.36.55/22 10.3.36.98/22
5.1.4 SIPp theory and usage
SIPp is an open source trafﬁc generator and simulation tool written in C++. It is designed to
test SIP scenarios, ﬂows and variations. SIPp is used with different purposes:
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• Verify grammatical correctness of SIP messages.
• Load test. Two or more endpoints can simulate hundreds or thousands of simultaneous
calls.
Testing of the SIPBIO messaging on SIPp is a key preamble in the implementation of the
protocol. An implementation of the protocol is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, by
simulating SIPBIO with SIPp its messaging consistency and workability are proven.
To use SIPp, XML conﬁguration ﬁles, called scenarios, must be created to hold the SIP mes-
saging in segments known as macros. These macros are placed between actions that instruct
the endpoint on how to handle the messaging. For instance, listing 5.1 shows the initial seg-
ment of the scenario of the client SIPBIO endpoint while listing 5.2 shows the counterpart for
the server SIPBIO endpoint.
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Allow: INVITE, ACK, CANCEL, OPTIONS, BYE, REFER, NOTIFY,


















Allow: INVITE, ACK, CANCEL, OPTIONS, BYE, CANCEL, REFER















In both, client and server scenarios, the same pattern can be identiﬁed:
• A scenario starts with the scenario keyword. Some keywords have properties, for instance,
the scenario keyword has a property called name to label the scenario.
• An action is triggered by a keyword. In the case of listing 5.1, the ﬁrst keyword is send. It
indicates to the SIPp endpoint that the message inside the keyword tags is to be sent across
to the other SIPp endpoint in the conversation.
• Meanwhile, at listing 5.2, the pair endpoint ﬁrst action keyword (after its own deﬁnition) is
recv. Note also that it just does not expect to receive anything, it expects to receive a SIP
request of type OPTIONS. If, and only if, a SIP OPTIONS request is received, the endpoint
carries on with the next action. In this case the next action is a send of a 200 OK SIP
response.
• Consequently, the initial endpoint is waiting (recv) for a response of type 200.
• The same logic goes on until the end of the message which, as usual, is expected to be a
BYE requests followed by a 200 OK response.
Once the scenarios are deﬁned the endpoints, SIPBIO endpoints in this case, are made to run
as such. For instance for the test layout shown in ﬁgure 5.1, the endpoints can be started as
shown next.
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UAS:> # sipp -sn basicBioServer
UAC:> # sipp -sn basicBioClient 10.3.36.98
Where basicBioServer and basicBioClient are the respective names of the server and client
XML ﬁles, with the conﬁguration of the SIPBIO scenarios to test. Both commands shown
above are to be started from the command console of the incumbent servers.
5.2 Test scenarios
This section illustrates two basic test scenarios to illustrate the consistency and viability of
SIPBIO.
Due to the nature of the SIPBIO XML body content, the maximum transmission unit (MTU)
authorized in the network (usually 1500 bytes ) may be easily be reached. This would result
in IP fragmentation. The datagram is then split across multiple IP packets. When using UDP
as a transport protocol, if a fragment is lost, the entire datagram is lost. To avoid this situation
TCP was chosen as the transport protocol for the tests. RFC 3261 speciﬁcally acknowledges
this situation when using UDP (Rosenberg et al., 2002).
5.2.1 Base test scenario
The ﬁrst scenario to test is the ideal scenario with no errors. To achieve client and server
behaviour, templates with idealised event responses are created. The resulting SIPBIO events
of the communication are shown in 5.2. This SIP trace is the reﬂection of the ﬂow diagram
shown in Figure 4.1. The corresponding trapezoid is shown in Figure 5.3, although the packet
dissector of he analysis tool (Wireshark) does not take the initial OPTIONS message as part of
the communication ﬂow. A dissection of the individual messages follows. Since the objective
of each SIP message has been previously explained, only the key features are commented on.
108
Figure 5.2 Test scenario 1.
Figure 5.3 Test scenario 1, associated trapezoid.
OPTIONS The ﬁrst message is the request from bio-client to bio-server to determine what
features are available as shown in Figure 5.4. Nothing is speciﬁc to SIPBIO in the OP-
TIONS message.
Figure 5.4 Test scenario 1, OPTIONS.
200 OK (to OPTIONS) This message is the beginning of the biometric-related content. The
bio-server replies with a minimum set of supported biometric features for the bio-client
to properly initiate the conversation. Figure 5.5 shows the relevant sections in the SIP
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message. In the Supported header the bio-server notiﬁes that it supports biometric analy-
sis (bioanalysis) and that it is also able to support different types of biometric payloads as
well as being able to support several types of interactions (mutipayload and multibiotype,
respectively).
The message body, an XML structure, contains the speciﬁc types of payloads and bio-
metric operations along with other key pieces of information: the bio-server informs that
it supports reception of the payload by either a direct URL link (uri) or through a direct
stream, where it requires a complementary protocol (e.g. SDP or MRCP). This speciﬁc
bio-server is ready to support biometric parameters as handled by Nuance, Microsoft or
Google. This vendor ﬁeld is an example of different features that can be speciﬁed in-
side the XML structure. A bio-client can choose to only use the parameters provided by
the bio-server, or fewer additional ones. The only ones sure to be accepted are the ones
carried by this message.
INVITE This is the ﬁrst message in the SIP communication exchange and the pillar of the
SIPBIO interaction. A bio-client proposes to start a communication channel with the
objective of transmitting biometric information and to carry related information. Fig-
ure 5.6 shows a sample in detail. Notably, the message header explicitly expresses that
bionalysis must be supported, otherwise the exchange cannot be completed. In this ex-
ample only one payload and one biometric type are to be chosen, this is why no explicit
requirement for multi-feature support is required.
The body content includes the types explicitly expressed in the previous OPTIONS mes-
sage but also expands on more detailed characteristics of the payload format (sampling
frequency, ﬁle types available, encoding types and audio sides). It also introduces new
content, namely, the claimed identity and grouping attribute. The bio-client is coded to
probe with this variation, however, even if the bio-server does not explicitly express its
support, this does not mean it is not capable of processing them.
200 OK (to INVITE) This message is the response to the INVITE. It starts, or in some cases
settles, the negotiation. To the requests of a bio-client, the bio-server responds with what
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Figure 5.5 Test scenario 1, 200 OK to OPTIONS.
it actually is able to support. For instance, in Figure 5.6 it is shown that the client can
process active, passive and off-line biometric operations; the bio-server, however, replies
that it only supports the two ﬁrst types. Figure 5.7 shows the entire response.
ACK This is the message that establishes the ﬁnal values to be used as a base for the media
transmission, along with those to be passed to the biometric engine. It completes the
customary three-way handshake for SIP communications. At this stage the bio-client
client selects values for each component in the chosen XML structure. Figure 5.8 shows
the resulting conﬁguration in detail. This time the bio-client decided on an active voice
biometric authentication for a Nuance-provided solution. The voice (payload) to be anal-
ysed is being supplied as a WAV ﬁle, reachable through a URL. The audio ﬁle contains
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Figure 5.6 Test scenario 1, INVITE.
one single audio channel (mono) with encoding / acoustic characteristics of 8KHz, 8-
bit A-Law. The audio is claimed to contain the voice of a customer identiﬁed with ID
71777287. The XML structure also contains some additional information, classiﬁed as
metadata that may also be of interest, if not for the biometric transaction, then for report-
ing or extra actions coordinated by the bio-server.
At this point of the communication exchange the bio-client and bio-server, or the parties
negotiated by them, exchange the biometric payload. In the example shown, an HTTP re-
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Figure 5.7 Test scenario 1, 200 OK to INVITE.
quest is likely to be made by the bio-server to the media server reachable by mediarepos-
itory.corp. The HTTP request aims at obtaining the wave audio ﬁle 201718111551003.
Once the media exchange is completed and the biometric results are available, the rest of
the SIPBIO messaging exchange is completed as shown next.
BYE In most regular SIP operations, the BYE message is simply an indication of the wish of
one of the parties to end the session. SIPBIO enhances the BYE message with message
body content carrying the results of the biometric operation along with any other infor-
mation suitable to the XML structure and usable by the bio-client. Figure 5.9 shows the
content for the sample operation where the bio-server informs that customer 71777287
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Figure 5.8 Test scenario 1, ACK.
was previously registered and the provided audio ﬁle corresponds to their biometric char-
acteristics with a conﬁdence of 98.5%.
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Figure 5.9 Test scenario 1, BYE.
200 OK (to BYE) The ﬁnal message of the exchange that acknowledges its termination is the
200 OK to the BYE. This is a standard SIP message and it is only mentioned here for
completeness.
Figure 5.10 Test scenario 1, 200 OK to BYE.
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5.2.2 Test scenario with partial results notiﬁcations
Previous sections focused on the simple biometric session where once provided with the pay-
load information, sole feedback from the bio-server is the result. When the biometric operation
takes a long time (for instance, more than two seconds) the bio-client requires partial results
to apply programming logic or, simply, to notify other applications. This type of scenario
corresponds to the one discussed in Subsection 4.4.7 and represented in Figure 4.5.
This test scenario is reproduced in the same conditions as the one discussed in the previous
section. Since the initial session establishment are the same in both scenarios, only those
messages that are new or different are dissected in the analysis.
A SIP trace of this scenario and its corresponding trapezoid are shown in ﬁgures 5.11 and 5.12
respectively.
Figure 5.11 Test scenario 2.
Besides the obvious number of additional messages, there is one key difference in this scenario
compared with the one in Section 5.2.1: biometric results are given as part of a NOTIFY and
BYE messages do not carry any payload. These differences make this scenario more in line
with regular usage of other SIP applications as explained in Subsection 4.4.7. In detail message
information is shown next.
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Figure 5.12 Test scenario 2, associated trapezoid.
SUBSCRIBE Once the three-way handshake is completed, the bio-client proceeds to sign up
for bio-server events. The SUBSCRIBE message notably speciﬁes the type of events
being supported: dialog and sipbioStatus of type sipbio-xml. This message is followed
by a 200 OK from the bio-server conﬁrming the acceptance of the request.
Figure 5.13 Test scenario 2, SUBSCRIBE.
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NOTIFY A bio-server should notify its subscriber according to logic sensible for the applica-
tion. It is up to the implementation to set the options properly. Information is provided
to the bio-client as a sipbioStatus XML structure.
For the scenario that is being tested, the ﬁrst NOTIFY is sent once a percentage of the
payload has been analysed. In the current simulation a valuer of 40% payload analysis
is shown for illustration purposes. The actual value would depend on the frequency of
the notiﬁcations and the speed of the biometric engine. In cases where the payload size
is not previously known, time based notiﬁcations, or any suitable parameter, can be used
to trigger the message. Figure 5.14 shows the details. The XML content clearly states
that it is a partial result for which no biometric decision has been already made based on
an analysis certainty of 0%.
This interaction belongs to a veriﬁcation, as already stated on previous messages. The
implementation is free to choose parameters and interpretations of content. For the test
case it is assumed that there is no match (positive biometric authentication) unless a
threshold of certainty is reached.
Figure 5.15 shows the second set of results where there is still a high level of uncertainty,
which leads to a mismatch conclusion albeit 80% of the payload has been already anal-
ysed. This partial result allows the bio-client to implement logic to inform third party
dependent components (or end users) aware of the operation status.
The ﬁnal set of results is shown in Figure 5.16. A certainty of 98.5% after having anal-
ysed 100% of the payload, allows to determine a match. Even though the represented
interaction is a toy example of a real implementation, it exposes the work essential of the
messages. A sipbioStatus structure can be expanded with as many as available pieces of
information. Biometric engines provide different levels of results granularity that can be
used to enrich the NOTIFY action when relevant.
Un-SUBSCRIBE Once the bio-client receives al information it is expecting, it should proceed
to un-subscribe from notiﬁcations. This is accomplished by sending a new SUBSCRIBE
with a Expires header ﬁeld equals to zero as displayed in Figure 5.17. At this point the
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Figure 5.14 Test scenario 2, NOTIFY (partial result 1).
biometric process is completed. The implementation can either enhance the process with
new biometric operations over the same session or wrap it up.
BYE In contrast to the simple scenario described in Subsection 5.2.1, this time the BYE mes-
sage does not constitute part of the biometric operation and it is simply used as a regular
SIP message to trigger the end of the dialogue. Comparably, this is a more orthodox
usage of a BYE. Developers can use this approach to maintain higher compatibility with
other SIP implementations.
These two sections are merely an introduction to feasible implementation scenarios for SIP-
BIO. They were prepared in order to illustrate the validity of SIPBIO as viable communication
protocol under the conditions of operations of biometric transactions. The groundwork has
been laid for customisation of the protocol if required. All XML structures are ﬂexible to al-
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Figure 5.15 Test scenario 2, NOTIFY (partial
result 2).
Figure 5.16 Test scenario 2, NOTIFY (Final
result).
low for any type of implementation requirement and the construction of any other operational
scenario.
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Figure 5.17 Test scenario 2, Un-SUBSCRIBE.
Figure 5.18 Test scenario 2, BYE.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
As biometric technologies become omnipresent in everyday life, there is a need for standard
integration methodologies. This thesis proposes to satisfy this need by creating the logical
framework for SIPBIO. The question of this research is if it is possible to extend SIP to cover
cases of biometric interactions.
This work began by presenting SIP as a general-use protocol with applicability to a limitless
number of situations. The basics of biometric technologies and their use in telecommunica-
tions networks were examined, leading to the exploration of expanding the base SIP protocol
to support alternative requirements and scenarios. The foundation of the proposal, through
scenarios covered by SIPBIO, were explained and presented; this was followed by an outline
of the concepts with a detailed expansion of the proposed protocol. Finally, a simulation of a
potential implementation was presented to guide prospective SIPBIO developers.
This thesis starts from the basic SIP protocol as deﬁned in RFC 3261 by Rosenberg et al. (2002)
and follow the guidelines to author SIP extensions as proposed by Rosenberg and Schulzrinne
(2006). It develops a new protocol, SIPBIO, to support session establishment for executing
biometric transactions. The proposal was proven to be feasible.
Previous works led the way to identify a mechanism to design protocol extensions. Of singular
importance for the development of a working design were the proposal to extend SIP to support
payments and micropayments developed by Ruiz-Martinez et al. (2016); Ruiz-Martínez et al.
(2007); SIPBIO borrows the same algorithm of communication establishment and the same
model of data transmission but applies them to biometric interactions.
Two key characteristics of biometric operations were found amenable to the concept of SIP
oriented operations:
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• A biometric interaction requires a stage of session establishment where general character-
istics are negotiated.
• A biometric operation aims to exchange media content between parties.
This proposal explains how these two characteristics led to a set of clear standardization poli-
cies and a corroborated conclusion that a protocol to drive biometric exchanges could be cre-
ated through an extension to the base SIP protocol. SIPBIO demonstrates that it is possible to
expand a well-known - widely adopted protocol, SIP, to facilitate biometric interactions.
Through the development of SIPBIO, the assumption that biometric transactions could be rep-
resented as groups of SIP messages, was corroborated. SIPBIO follows the path created by
previous protocols like SIPREC, which extended SIP to create a solution to problems faced in
the industry. In the case of SIPREC, it is call recording, while for SIPBIO it is biometric trans-
actions. This trend is a validation of the capacity of SIP to mutate depending on the requirement
whist still maintaining its core functionality. It has been attested during the development of the
protocol that SIP indeed allows for ﬂexibility without compromising structure.
Being a SIP-based protocol, SIPBIO is easily comprehended by developers and implementers.
It can be simulated using standard tools such as SIPp, largely easing the actual development
of a solution based on proven scenarios. Applications can be developed using well known,
industry standard, IDE such as Eclipse4 or IntellyJ5.
SIPBIO does not pretend to handle data security. It relies on SIP basic mechanisms of authen-
tication and the capabilities of lower layers to keep information and communication channels
private and secured. Due to the nature of the information handled by SIPBIO, it is not advisable




data. Try to have it handle security as well would not add value to SIPBIO. It is recommended
to leave that role to the appropriate layers.
Although SIPBIO has the theoretical basics required to implement any biometric operation in
a variety of environments, further work needs to be completed in order to provide better inte-
gration with industry vendor CTI solutions. Unfortunately, there is not a CTI communication
standard, every vendor exposes a different set of APIs. This leads to costly bespoke solutions.
As CTI data is required in most passive biometric integrations, a middleware is a valid approach
to bridge CTI and SIPBIO enabled systems. It would make an interesting project to propose a
SIPBIO branch to handle CTI information. Being SIP, by design, a signalling protocol a new
SIPBIO-based protocol could be proposed to primarily handle CTI messages.
This research demonstrates the feasibility of the protocol by playing scenarios that can be used
later by developers to parametrise their designs. A practical project derived from this thesis
could be the creation of a SIPBIO SDK implementation. Any existing SIP SDK should be the
starting point to build one for SIPBIO. It is not advisable to create an entire implementation
from scratch.
An interesting practical project derived from this thesis would be a stress test of the protocol.
This could be done by placing several scenarios running in parallel between the same actors
with slight differences in the requested the biometric operation. Requests must be generated
in the same volume as in commercial systems. This type of test would expose any ﬂow in
the protocol logic under real time scenarios, including but not limited to performance and race
conditions.
During the development of the protocol proposal, SIPBIO was presented to application de-
velopers and system architects with experience in telecommunications. The reception was
not always warm. While architects appreciated the effort to provide a standard platform for
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exchanging biometric transactions, developers were not as interested. The latter group had
difﬁculty seeing any utility at all in the proposal because they saw the problem as having been
already solved by classical programming techniques where application transactions are usually
transported through HTTP or other socket communications. It is understood that the SIPBIO
niche must start in the telecommunications industry with vendors able to provide API and SDK
featuring the capabilities of the protocol. With the rise of biometric applications in mobile envi-
ronments as well as in the ﬁnancial industry, the call for easier, faster and standardised methods
to implement solutions opens a plethora of opportunities for SIPBIO to be used.
APPENDIX I
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
• 3G Third Generation
• 3GPP 3rd Generation Partnership Project
• AOR Address-of-Record
• API Application Program Interface
• API Application Program Interface
• B2BUA Back-to-Back User Agent
• CSP Communication Sequential Processes
• DB Database
• DHCP Dynamic Host Control Protocol
• DRM Digital Rights Management
• EAP Extensible Authentication Protocol
• ECG Electrocardiogram
• EER Equal Error Rate
• ETS École de Technologie Supérieure
• ETSI European Telecommunications Standards Institute
• FA False Accept
• FAR False Acceptance Rate
• FQDN Fully Qualiﬁed Domain Name
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• FR False Reject
• FRR False Rejection Rate
• HTTP Hyper Text Transfer Protocol
• HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
• HTTPS Secured Hypertext Transfer Protocol
• IDE Integrated Development Environment
• IDM3G Identity Management Protocol
• IETF Internet Engineering Task Force
• ISP Internet Service Provider
• IVR Interactive Voice Response
• LAN Local Area Network
• MO Mobile Operator
• MSRP Message Session Relay Protocol
• MTU Maximum transmission unit
• OASIS Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards
• OS Operative System
• OTAVB One-time Active Voice Biometrics authentication
• PIN Personal Identiﬁcation Number
• PKI Public Key Infrastructure
• PPBA privacy preserving biometric authentication protocol
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• QoS Quality of Service
• RFC Request for Comments
• RTP Real-time Transport Protocol
• SBC Session Border Controller
• SDK Software Development Kit
• SDN Software Deﬁned Networking
• SDP Session Description Protocol
• SIM Subscriber Identiﬁcation Module
• SIP Session Initiation Protocol
• SIPREC Session Initiation Protocol Recording
• SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol
• SP Service Provider
• SRC Session Recording Client
• SRS Session Recording Server
• TCP Transmission Control Protocol
• TDM Time-division multiplexing
• TLS Transport Layer Security
• TMN Telecommunications Management Networks
• UA User Agent
• UAC UA Client
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• UAS UA Server
• UDP User Datagram Protocol
• UID Unique Identiﬁcation
• UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunications Systems
• URI Universal Resource Identiﬁer
• USIM user’s SIM or Universal Subscriber Identity Module
• USS User Session Signature
• VPN Virtual Private Network
• VoIPSEC Voice Interactive Personalized Security protocol
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